



**United Nations Advance Mission In Sudan  
UNAMIS**

**Oral Statement of the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General for Sudan, Mr. Jan Pronk  
to the Security Council  
5 October 2004**

In my presentation to the Council, one month ago, I informed you about the progress and lack of progress in the implementation of the requirements set out in Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004). There was some progress, I said, in a number of areas. I noted each of them separately, in order to pin the government down on the implementation of what had been promised or agreed. However, as I also said, in some key areas the government had not met its commitments. It had not stopped attacks by militias against civilians nor started to disarm these militias. Moreover, no concrete steps had been taken to bring justice to perpetrators of the attacks, allowing violations of human rights to continue in a climate of impunity.

Today we are one month on. In that month the achievements of August have not been reversed. In these areas the government has kept its promises. However, that is not good enough. There was no systematic improvement of people's security and no progress on ending impunity.

In September we saw the following pattern. There were still breaches of the cease fire from both sides, attacks and counter attacks, revenge and retaliation. There were attacks by the army, sometimes involving helicopter gunships, though less frequently towards the end of the month. SLA attacks took place with greater frequency throughout the period, but they were more directed against the police than against the army. These cease fire breaches resulted not only in losses of life of armed personnel, but also in civilian casualties. However, most civilian deaths were caused by militia attacks, some of which were quite atrocious in the beginning of September. Towards the end of the month militia attacks became less frequent. In the same period, however, armed banditry rose at an alarming rate, endangering both the local population and aid convoys.

Despite the fact that both the Government of Sudan and the rebel movements have reiterated their commitment to the cease fire, breaches continued. In the past month we have been engaged in talks in order to keep such violations under control. Some clashes resulted from a deficient implementation of the agreements concerning the initial safe areas. We have worked out a procedure to avoid this in the future. However, the Government refused to agree to follow this procedure as long as the rebels fail to identify their troop positions. Pragmatic agreements on the ground, for instance to respect the status quo, might help. But ultimately a truly respected ceasefire can only come from the African Union sponsored Abuja talks.

A second key area is that of impunity. The government still fails to bring the perpetrators of atrocities to justice. Some people have been arrested, jailed and prosecuted, but the leaders are still walking free. Last week the Council heard reports presented by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. Arbour, and the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, Mr. Mendez. I will not repeat what they have said. I fully agree with their analysis, their conclusions and their recommendations. Without a drastic reversal of the climate of impunity there is no hope for peace.

The establishment of the Commission of Inquiry, as announced in the most recent Security Council Resolution, represents a major advance in this respect. In the 17 September meeting of the Joint Implementation Mechanism the Government of Sudan said that it welcomed the commission. Initially they had feared that the report of the commission had already been drafted before it had started its work. However, the Government has expressed its confidence in the Secretary General of the United Nations, trusting that the mandate and the composition of the commission would ensure its independence. The work of the commission is important, because many violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been committed. They have been widely documented, for instance in an excellent report of the League of Arab States, already in May 2004 and in reports of human rights NGO's as well as by UN staff in the field. However, many reports are ad hoc and unverified. Some lack a reference to a specific time or place or fail to name the perpetrators. Also for that reason it is important that the Commission completes a thorough investigation.

So, in the key areas there was no progress. However, there are signs of improvement on the political front. Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004) does lay the basis for further progress, both in terms of security and at the negotiating table. It does so in two respects. First by deciding on an expanded AU force. Second, by paving the way for a resumption of the political negotiations.

In the mid September meeting of the Joint Implementation Mechanism the government of Sudan announced that it would accept a greater AU presence and welcome more troops and more tasks. This has by now been confirmed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs before the Security Council. In my view it is very important that steps are taken to begin the deployment of the extended AU force already in the coming weeks. The force needs to be sizable. It needs to be speedily deployed. It also needs to be a force with a mandate far beyond overseeing the N'djamena cease fire agreement. There are many tasks to be fulfilled that are not directly related to insecurity resulting from Government/SLA clashes. Let me mention some examples. Ensuring the safety of displaced persons in the camps. Monitoring the behavior and actions of the police. Guaranteeing the safe return of refugees and displaced people to the areas where they came from. Preventing others from occupying their land or seizing their property. Overseeing the disarming of fighters: Popular Defense Forces, Janjaweed and other militia. Last but not least the force should also be able to act as a buffer between the civilian population and possible attackers.

There may be hesitations. Can all this be done by the African Union force as presently foreseen? Maybe, maybe not. But whatever the answer is, it is clear that these tasks have to be fulfilled. Many of these would be more police than military tasks. Police tasks to protect people. That is the responsibility, even the duty, of the government, but it cannot do this alone. Too much has happened, too many mistakes have been made in the past, too many crimes have been committed for which official authorities bear responsibility, too much confidence has been lost. For all these reasons we need a third party, of course without allowing the government to sit back, relax and wait. A third party is needed, and presently that is the African Union. It can help to protect the people by being present over a wide area, by being seen, by acting as a deterrent.

The adjustments necessary for the expanded AU mission were set out in the 28 September report to the Council. I hope that the Security Council will support the Secretary General's proposals in this regard.

The second most important issue to be solved in the month ahead concerns the political talks between the government and the SPLM/A. In my previous report I have mentioned the reasons why these negotiations are crucial for the solution of the conflict in Darfur. The outcome of the North-South peace process - peace, a new constitution, a federal structure for the state, a broad based government and differentiation in governance systems - can serve as a

basis for Darfur. The North-South process is a two-edged sword: success will go far beyond North-South; failure will endanger Sudan as a whole and also the region, including many neighboring countries. All parties should invest their political energy in reaching a final result of these talks. It now seems, after more than a decade of talking, waiting and betting on two horses, that this is a last chance. So, the international community should ensure that the momentum is sustained, that it gives the right signal to the parties, forceful, united, speaking with one voice. The political momentum is there: on October 7 the Vice-President Taha of Sudan, will meet Dr. Garang, Chairman of the SPLM, in Nairobi. They have responded to international pressure to kick start the resumption of the talks. It is important that they confirm that no earlier agreements will be opened up. They can define the framework for the final round of the talks which should lead to a peace agreement before the end of this calendar year. The Security Council may wish to send a small delegation, in order to make clear that the international community is watching and will not easily accept any further delay or hindrances by whichever party.

The talks on Darfur in Abuja were only partially successful. An agreement concerning humanitarian access could not be signed. With regard to security, the parties fell back on earlier positions. A stalemate resulted. The main issues - the political objectives and future economic development - have not yet been dealt with. This is deplorable. The talks should not only concentrate on humanitarian issues and security questions that can be addressed elsewhere. They should focus on the political and economic roots of the conflict: political neglect and economic marginalization. There won't be any improvement in Darfur if there is no agreement guaranteeing political inclusion and sustainable development for all. Exclusion and mal-development were at the origin of the North-South conflict. This caused the rebellion in Darfur and the conflicts elsewhere in the country, including East Sudan.

In order to reach a comprehensive and sustainable solution of the Sudanese conflicts three conditions should be met. First: political leaders, including the government, should care for their people, protect them, guarantee their rights as citizens and human beings, provide them with the chances for a decent life. Care for the weak and the poor seems to be a scarce commodity in Khartoum. Second, the constitutional and the institutional framework of the country should reflect the existing diversities within the nation, provide for a fair degree of regional autonomy, which helps the country not to fall apart. Third, an economic development policy based upon a fair distribution of the country's resources and directed towards poverty reduction and sustainable development as the first and foremost objective.

How can the international community help to meet these conditions? By following a strategy that is comprehensive, unified and well-focused. I venture the following:

One. Follow a tripartite approach: provide adequate humanitarian assistance, ensure security and protection and address the root causes of the conflict. All three elements are necessary, neither of them is sufficient in itself. Do not limit international action to an end of pipe approach, helping victims but allowing the causes of the drama to continue.

Two. Create the conditions for a swift transition from relief and protection towards rehabilitation, capacity building and development. Partner countries, donors, UN agencies and NGO's must work towards the next phase as soon as possible. Create a perspective for development that can be sustained from within. Otherwise Sudan would be doomed to become a beggars country, a potential theatre for external forces aiming at international destabilization.

Third. Increase financial assistance. There were already more than 4 million Sudanese refugees and displaced people before the outbreak of the conflict in Darfur. They were the victims of a forgotten war. There are now an additional 1.4 million in and around Darfur. In that part of the country the number of conflict affected people comes close to 2 million. That

figure may rise to 3 to 4 million if the civil war continues and renders domestic agriculture and food production impossible. These are staggering figures, demanding a serious effort, not ad hoc and short term but sustained.

Fourth. Aim at a comprehensive political solution. Use the breadth of the agreements reached in the North-South protocols as a basis for solution of the conflicts elsewhere in Sudan. The people of all areas of Sudan will have to be included in a national process: rebel movements, tribal leaders throughout the country, opposition groups in Khartoum or in exile, religious leaders, civil society, women's groups, and, last but not least, the young, the generation that will have to build a new Sudan. Start a process of restoring confidence, reconciliation and consensus building before rushing into procedures that are not owned by the Sudanese people themselves.

Five. Make the solution of the conflicts in Sudan an African project. Help the African Union to realize that project. Provide the Union with all resources needed, finance, logistics, implementation capacity, training, expertise and, if requested, personnel. Provide this aid additional to humanitarian and development assistance. Avoid competition for resources. There is no trade off. We are confronted with the worst humanitarian crisis of today. It is a man made conflict that, if not properly addressed, could create the conditions for a widening regional or even global confrontation.

Six. Put pressure on the present political leaders to change their policies towards the above objectives. External political pressure helps, that is one of the experiences from the past three months. Constructive pressure, no mixed signals, no messages that create the impression that whether a regime does or does not comply would be irrelevant because the regime has to be changed anyway. Combine pressure on the regime with adequate monitoring and a fair degree of trust and acknowledgement of good performance. Make the process of change indigenous. Leave no room for other options than complying with the demands of the international community. However, at the same time make clear that a government that keeps its promises, negotiates seriously with its opponents and lives up to agreements can be a respected partner in that international community. Aim not at regime change but at regime character change. Make a change of the character of the regime in the interest of the regime itself, which then will be embedded in a new structure together with all other forces in Sudan which hitherto were excluded.

Seven: Build confidence between groups that due to the present conflict oppose each other, or are being told by their leaders that they have to oppose each other because the other party is the enemy. Prevent the conflicts in Sudan turning into a general antagonism between people with different religions or different ethnic backgrounds. Once the struggles in Sudan are perceived as a clash between cultures - Arabs against Africans, Sudan versus the West, Islam versus the rest - they become unmanageable and spread towards other places. So, de-escalate rather than escalate, seek dialogue rather than confrontation.

It is in this spirit that we try to fulfill our mission.