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### SRSR PRESS CONFERENCE

*Below is a near verbatim transcript of the press conference by SRSR Jan Pronk held on 8<sup>th</sup> May 2006 at UNMIS Press Briefing Room, Ramsis Building.*

**Spokesperson Elkoussy:** Thank you for coming.

Mr. Jan Pronk just came back from Abuja. This is going to be the main topic of this press conference, so I turn the floor to him.

**SRSR Pronk:** Thank you for coming on a Monday which is not a regular day for the press conference which is always on Wednesday but I thought it was important enough, after the breakthrough in Abuja, to have a press conference today where we could say something about the importance of what happened. I would be brief and I would be available for questions.

Firstly let me congratulate the people of Darfur and the people of Sudan with the peace agreement which has been signed in Abuja. It is very important breakthrough after a long period of negotiations which started somewhere in October in the year 2004; that means one and a half year talks which now finally did result in an agreement.

I went 12 times to Abuja. It seems to be quite many times; there were people who were there continuously throughout all the sessions. There were of course major breaks but the 7<sup>th</sup> round which started end of November – if you remember – had to meet a deadline by the 31<sup>st</sup> of November; they didn't. My advice was: never and 8<sup>th</sup> round – just continue talking and stop the clock until you reach a conclusion during the 7<sup>th</sup> round. And that has been done.

Congratulations; good work.

Number two: I am happy but not, of course, satisfied because there is an agreement but not everybody has signed the agreement. But it is important to highlight the fact that this is not a partial agreement between the government and one of the movements resulting from a series of consecutive talks on the basis of divide and rule. Very often in Sudan, the government – let's be honest – has used a 'divide and rule' tactic – we talk with some; we do not talk with

others. That was not the case in Abuja. The government talked with everybody at the same time – not consecutive – at the same time; parallel; together in meetings which were attended by all parties at the same time – transparent. It means that some of those who did talk with the government said “yes” and others said “no”. That is their responsibility. But it is not a partial; it is a comprehensive agreement. It is free for all parties to join.

Undoubtedly, later on there will be criticism that this is an agreement only with some. The criticism would have been justified if there would have been separate talks. There were no separate talks, there were talks with everybody. In terms of procedure, it is a good procedure – balanced; open; transparent.

Point three: not in terms of procedure but also in terms of content, it is a good text. It is a balanced text. The United Nations has backed the text which was proposed by the African Union leadership, Salim Salim, ten days ago. Late in the process; difficult therefore for parties to swallow, but not too late because it was late in order to make it possible to incorporate in that text all the views of all the parties which had been expressed during all these six rounds. So it was not a text at the beginning which you could tear apart and then substitute by a completely new text. No; it was a text at the end which was reflecting the views of all the parties already.

It was not my text but I say, “We back the African Union”. It was not a ‘take it or leave it’ text. It was possible for the parties enrich it – that was the terminology used – to improve it; to add to it; but not of course to try to substitute it with a text which was just the original list of demands by the parties 18 months ago. That would not have been fair. So we did ask the parties to please take it; don’t leave it; study it; enrich it; improve it; come with a number of improvements – that is the normal way to negotiate in such a situation.

Some addressed the text by just coming again with their original ideas as if these original ideas had not yet been taken into account in the compromised text. They came with a long shopping list again and then they said, “This text does not meet our expectations” as if your expectations are the yardstick and have to be fully met in a negotiation which is not possible.

In my meetings which I had with the parties I did say, and I like to repeat it, “If you fight with weapons, you win or you lose – there is a victory or defeat. In a fight you never have a compromise; you either win or lose. If you decide, while fighting, to move to talking, you can not win or lose. You rack a compromise. Fighting never results in a compromise. Talking never results in a victory or a defeat. Talking results in a compromise – a position somewhere in the middle”. This text, the DPA, in my view having been there 12 times and having studied all the submissions of all the parties, is a fair compromised text meeting expectations of parties halfway. That is good enough. By the way, halfway is never the end because one of the important elements of the DPA is power sharing; and that is political. You start as a military movement; you fight; then you go for negotiations - you talk in order; to get the results which give you the possibility to act as a political movement and the political party thereafter. You participate in the power institutions; you get seats in institutions; you create new institutions and you use them in order to get a more democratic society within which you can negotiate, talk, politically further after the negotiations and then you get the power or not if you have enough people behind you using democratic means. So then you can say’ “While using our political capabilities resulting from such a peace agreement which we have negotiated, we can even get more in a normal political process thereafter whereby we compete with each other with ideas.” That is the way it has to be.

I am pleased that one of the parties, the Mini Minnawi faction, had the courage to decide to go from fighting to negotiating and from negotiations to accepting a basis for political activities now in Darfur - and that is important.

I am not pleased that the other two parties – the AbdulWahid faction and JEM - did not have that courage.

For some it may be surprising that the JEM, which was more of a political than a fighting body because they don't have many troops on the ground, did not wish to use the new political capacity which has been delivered to all parties by the political process. In my view, it means that they betray their own vision to be a political movement. Because they got a political possibility they don't want to use their political capacity to further their own ideas. They have put themselves aside.

I also deplore that AbdulWahid did not have the courage to join. He came back with the old shopping list. And I told him in a meeting after we have signed the peace agreement – of course I did not sign, but I signed as a witness together with the other representatives of the international community - that in my view he made a mistake. That when he says that the expectations of his people have not been met, that he clearly uses war language and not negotiating language. Because then he wants everything; he wants the majority rather than a compromise.

It is still possible for those who did not sign the agreement to join it. It is not possible to reopen the talks and to reopen the text. This is the text – no change; not a coma. Others can join or [*indiscernible*]. They still can join it always but they have to associate themselves with the text as it is and it has been negotiated.

I made an appeal in my meeting with AbdulWahid after the meeting to do so - he rejected that. I made an appeal on all members of his constituency to dissociate themselves from their leadership and to join the fair compromise. That means leaders of the Fur movement; that means also commanders. I am going tomorrow to Darfur to speak with parties to see to it whether the peace at the table will also be translated into peace on the ground. I understand that the Walis [*state governors*] have been given the instruction by the government to instruct the tribes to stop the fighting. And that is a very good decision by the government. I want to speak with the Walis on how they implement that instruction – to monitor it, that is my task.

I am going to speak with representatives of civil society, tribal leaders – to continue that – in order to explain, answer questions – it is not my agreement; it is their agreement – and to listen also and to tell them that, though they were not in Abuja, they would be in the Darfur-Darfur dialogue to further enrich, not to change it, but to further enrich the agreement. I am going to speak also with commanders of Mini Minnawi who will follow. I had a meeting by the way with Mr. Hagar who is the Chief of Staff of the SLM. He was also in Abuja and he assured me that he would stay with the agreement. There is no light between Hagar, the chief military of the SLM, and the political leader Mini Minnawi – I am very pleased with their statement. I am also going to speak also with their commanders in the field.

I will also go to speak with SLM-AbdulWahid commanders to try to convince them that they, despite the decision by AbdulWahid, could, and in my view, should associate themselves with the peace agreement which has been reached in Abuja. We will have to continue to do so. I have always said that there is a disconnect between what is going on on the ground and

what is going on in Abuja and, I must say, until 5<sup>th</sup> May, the day of the agreement, and including the 4<sup>th</sup> of May, I get all these reports about fights and fights and fights and retaliations and revenge. And that may continue. On the day of the signing of the agreement, the brother of Mini Minnawi was killed in Khor Abeche by an attack by militia on his village. They say it was retaliation for a previous attack by SLA against them looting camels. This, of course, then may be an incentive for the people around Mini Minnawi's brother to retaliate again. That is not what they should do. It is important to repeat: no retaliations; no revenge for what happened before. It is now peace. Stop the fighting; stop revenge; stop retaliations and if you want to have revenge, do it in court.

An end to impunity is only possible if there is no ongoing fight and ongoing retaliation. Now, everywhere, the follow up should take place in normal situations; in normal structures; in normal institutions, including those of courts and those of the Darfur-Darfur dialogue also which is very important.

I am also going to el-Fasher tomorrow. On Wednesday I will have a discussion with the African Union over there. We hope UN and the African Union together, to help monitoring, guiding, assisting and supporting in the implementation of the peace agreement.

I know, of course, despite what I said, there will be some fighting in Darfur in the weeks ahead. Not all parties with weapons on the ground were in Abuja. We still have the Janjaweed; we still have militia but they have to be instructed by the Walis; we still have some groups which belong to Chadian rebels; ... we still have warlords who started more or less for themselves. But anyway, there is now a very clear distinction line between those who had the courage to talk and reach a result and those cowards who only want to fight. That is the difference – those who are courageous and those who are cowards and attack unarmed civilians. And the African Union and others will have the task to make a clear distinction between those who are courageous and those who only are seeking their own benefit in a rather cowardly fashion. There should be a final end to the tragedy in Darfur not only in Abuja but also on the ground.

I said in my statement after the signing that the UN is ready to help all parties in the implementation with all the instruments at our disposal: humanitarian, political, civilian, recovery, reconciliation, peacekeeping, whatever. It is up to the parties – the government and the rebel movements – to say yes or no to the utilization of the instruments of the United Nations to the benefit of the people of Darfur.

**Spokesperson Elkoussy:** Thank you Mr. Pronk. Questions from the press?

**Q:** Following the agreement in Abuja, government reactions have differed on the coming of international forces to Darfur especially after the calls from the Secretary-General of the Arab League. There are some in the government who said that the coming stage will need such a deployment of international forces while there are some who oppose this while some still reject the [*Darfur*] agreement. What is your position on the deployment of international forces [*to Darfur*] now that the peace agreement has been signed?

What is the official UN position on those who did not sign the agreement?

**SRSB Pronk:** Thank you.

Firstly; I have learnt here in Khartoum that it is better always to wait until there is an overall position of the government as a whole rather than to listen to some individual statement. So I am waiting until the government has met – I don't think they have met yet; the [*Sudan government*] delegation [*Ito Abuja*] is returning I think today – so let me wait until there is an official position of the government as a whole and not react to individual statements.

The mirror side to that is that, also as far as the UN is concerned, I think you should wait until the Security Council has spoken. We will report.

On Monday, next Monday, there is a meeting of the AUPSC in Addis. There Mr. Salim [*Ahmed Salim*] will report and then the African Union will take decisions for instance with regards to their role in the implementation and maybe also with regards to their own role in terms of the continuation for a period, or extension or enlarging of AMIS on the ground.

They will have to do so, anyway, because it is a rather complicated ceasefire or peace agreement in terms of security ... more complicated than the N'Djamena one. And if they want to monitor that they will have to adjust their own forces to that new task. Their present forces are based on the task which was derived from the N'Djamena peace agreement. There is now a new one; N'Djamena is dead and has been superseded now by Abuja so they will have to take a decision how they will have to reorient or strengthen their forces in order to help the Sudanese to keep that peace - and we will help them. We have offered them the assistance – that is also one of the reasons I am going to el-Fasher in two days from now.

After the meeting of the AUPSC, the UN Security Council will meet to also listen to the outcome of the meeting in Addis Ababa. Then, of course, the question will rise – but that is for the Security Council to decide on what to do with the parties who did not sign.

My advice to anybody would be: don't take a decision yet. Give them time to reconsider. Not to talk and to renegotiate but to reconsider – give them time to talk with their own constituencies. Maybe the constituencies of AbdulWahid are wiser than he himself. It is possible; give them time. The African Union is giving them a week until that meeting. If they don't want to reconsider, then the Security Council undoubtedly will take some decisions. I don't know what. I heard some countries from the international community – I am only quoting and am not taking a position; please understand - say that then these people should be considered outlaws. I don't know whether other countries will take the same position; it is an option. I am not taking a position on that and am only following the lead of the Security Council and they have still to decide. I heard others say that then Resolution 1591 would apply to them. Now you remember that Resolution 1591 is a resolution which declares people who are impeding the peace process as eligible for sanctions. Those sanctions are clear. The sanctions are that you can not travel and your foreign assets are going to be frozen. Those are in the resolution.

It would mean – I am just talking theoretically – that the negotiators of those parties, say the JEM and AbdulWahid, who are not willing to sign and who did not come from Darfur but they came from the US, they came from the US, they came from Holland, they came from France, they came from Germany, would no longer be allowed to travel or to work or to study in those countries. That might be the consequence of 1591. It is quite interesting but that is 1591 and they know it. And that their assets, their bank accounts, will be frozen in those countries. It is a possibility – I don't know. It would not apply to the poor commanders

in Darfur itself who don't have assets and who don't travel but only fight. But the responsibility is, of course, for the leaders; the negotiators.

Again, I don't know what the outcome would be but I am answering your question. I mentioned two options which have been mentioned in Abuja and I am not pleading for anything. I am waiting for the Security Council to take some decisions.

I hope I am clear.

**Q:** Follow up to question by my colleague; you said that you are waiting for the official government reaction. Reaction to what? Have you formally requested a deployment of international forces to Darfur?

You said that those who have grievances should demand them through the courts. What courts are you referring to? Are you referring to the local courts or the ICC?

**SRSB Pronk:** President Obasanjo of Nigeria did a terrific job during the last couple of days in Abuja. He was chairing the last difficult days and he did so with all his skills and his humor and he taught everybody who was in the meeting and wanted to have a quick result: "step-by-step". And many of the negotiators and international observers quoted him quite a number of times, "step-by-step; don't hasten". I follow that. I love that approach and am a step-by-step person myself. It means rejoice in the peace agreement; rejoice in the peace. Next step, broaden it, the circle, to those who have not yet. Thirdly; translate the peace at the table into peace on the ground. Fourthly; make it possible for AMIS, the international force which is on the ground at the moment, to keep the peace which is new – it is a new peace agreement. Fifth; don't go for step number 5 to steps 1, 2, 3 and 4. That is why we have not taken step number five yet, not yet.

Secondly; national courts, of course, are always preferable. International courts should only be used when national courts have proven to be not working, not functioning.

**Q:** Mr. Pronk, at the University of Khartoum right now there is a demonstration against the peace agreement and, I think, from some reports, six students have been arrested. Reports I receive from Zalenge also say that the IDP camps there are revolting right now - and I think you can check with your sources - against the peace agreement. Seifeldeen Yousif, the spokesman of Mini Minnawi has described the peace agreement as "useless as toilet paper" – this is what he wrote. They said that this peace agreement does not mention the mechanism of disarming the Janjaweed and that their families have been displaced, their property looted and they have lost their lives despite the lives can not be compensated but actually they said that the property and the houses need to be compensated.

How do you evaluate this? Don't you think that the international community has used pressure on these groups to sign the peace agreement to find a chance because the Sudanese government has put a condition that they will never allow the deployment of United Nations forces to Darfur unless there is a peace agreement? So don't you think that the pressure was just to find a chance for the deployment of United Nations troops?

**SRSB Pronk:** It is a good question but the answer is, "no".

The international community has put pressure on all parties even-handedly in order to get peace; and not to come in. The international community never asked to enter. We only got that discussion in January after the African Union said, “We can not continue anymore”. The international community, the Security Council Resolution in September 2004, did invite the African Union to do the job. So please there is no second agenda; there is no hidden agenda. Please have some confidence in some sincerity of negotiators. They wanted peace for the sake of the people. I want that and many of them but also the colleagues coming from the other countries. I think that is the answer.

Second answer: I understand that there are protests. There are also demonstrations in favor. That is always the case. These were the people who didn’t negotiate themselves but, in a political system, they were represented. And those who did represent them at the negotiations table have the duty to go back to their own constituencies and to tell them what they decided and why they did decide so. In a democratic society that is always normal and self-evident. This country is not yet a democratic society so you have to go an additional mile. The press can play an important role by giving the floor to all the negotiators; interview them; making it possible for the negotiators to say through the press to their own people what they decided, why they decided so and to answer questions; to answer difficult questions – and that is your task, I would say, like I am trying also to answer your difficult questions. I understand that.

My answer to those who say, “we didn’t get everything which we wanted” is exactly the same: you can not expect to get everything which you wanted if there is a talk. And if you do not want to talk and you want to continue fighting you have perhaps a greater damage with more people being killed, more villages being burnt down so that you would like to ask for more compensations later on and that brings you in a sliding scale or in a vicious circle you will never get out of. At a certain moment, you have to put a stop.

Secondly: there are many languages about compensation in the peace agreement. There is language about it that has to be implemented. There was, at a certain moment a request by AbdulWahid for guarantees “if I sign, what is the guarantee that it is being implemented?” It is a fair question because I know the history of Sudan as well as you do – the government has, for decades, signed agreements and not honored them – you know the well-done book by Abel Alier. There are should be a stop to that approach. So it is a fair question.

He was given an answer and that he did not accept that answer means that he didn’t mean it. He was given a very far-reaching answer by the big powers – the US and the UK – what they would do. I can not give you information about it – you have to ask him and you have to ask them. But if I would have been given such a guarantee I would have rejoiced. We, the United Nations, gave him an answer. We have said: firstly; we are signing as witnesses and that means a lot. There is no peace agreement in Africa with the exception of the CPA which had so many witnesses and to sign as a witness means a commitment to stay as the international community. And as a matter of fact, it worked for the CPA and it will work as much for the DPA as for the CPA.

Number two: the peace agreement does result in a number of institutions: we have traditional authority, we have the DDD, we have a number of institutions in the field of reconstruction – read it. In all of them, the international community is participating. Exactly who is participating, you will find in the DPA. And that participation means that there is a commitment to influence the implementation of the agreement. For instance on compensation has a structure; there is a fund; there is some money. Compensation is for people and you can

be certain that the international community in the whole process of DDD, etc. will see to it that there can be compensation for people even if the figure is not yet known. As a matter of fact, the Darfur reconciliation, much more than anywhere else in the world, always can only be completed if there is, in official language, 'blood money' – that means compensation. So that will take place even if you do not know how much in advance. And I know there were talks between the government and the movements on how much money the government will make available for compensation and there were calculations already and the government was willing to sign a text which would be attached to the agreement. AbdulWahid refused finally but he could have, by signing the agreement, included an attachment on blood-money with figures for compensation. So those people who are protesting against it should direct their protests to those people who did not want to sign rather than those who did sign.

Thirdly: institutions, signing as witnesses. As soon as we made that clear that there is either a violation or a non-implementation of the agreement, the African Union representatives and the United Nations will address this through a reporting system to the African Union Peace & Security Council and the Security Council of the UN in New York which then will have the possibility to take action and will not let it go. There is no peace agreement in Africa, with the exception of the CPA, which has such guarantees so people, before they protest, should count their blessings. And before you count your blessings, I think you should read the text to have a demonstration now on the basis of an agreement which you have not read – it is 85 pages and is quite something. There is a lot in it. Don't just listen to some people who claim that something is in the text which is not in the text. Read it yourself before you take a specific position.

By the way, sir, I don't know whether it was you or one of your colleagues who asked that question, the spokesperson of Mini Minnawi is of the opinion, and Mini Minnawi's opinion, that this is a good agreement.

There are people who have some interest in portraying other people of having said something which is not at all true. I give you one example: when I was in Abuja, all of a sudden there was a piece of paper being circulated on Saturday plucked from the internet that Mr. Hagar had dissociated himself from Mini Minnawi. And Mr. Hagar is the chief military man of Mr. Minnawi. So you would understand that that created some rumors and I was afraid. So what did I do? Did I believe the paper? No; I took a cab and I went in the city to find the hotel where Mr. Hagar was. He was asleep. I asked to seem him and I was together with Kingibe because we both were concerned about. "Please get awake." So we came downstairs and we told him that there were some people who said that you did not agree and he was very angry. Not at us but at those who did lie about his approach. So please, if there are statements about others, check, check, check. Because there are some people who want to create confusion and that is not in the interest of peace.

**Q:** Are there talks underway to set a timetable for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue?

**SRSR Pronk:** I don't know the paragraphs by heart at the moment but in the peace agreement you will see that there is a timeframe – there are dates – D-Day or M-Day; that is the beginning that was the 5<sup>th</sup> of May. There is a specific period, I think two or three months I don't know exactly but it is in the text, within which the preparatory committee for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue has to take decisions on its format and also on who will participate. In the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue Preparatory Committee, there are the parties and the international community and the UN is included in that, together with others. So within the



period, those decisions will have to be made and then in the DPA, you also see when then the first meeting has to start. That consultation or that first meeting of the preparatory committee has not yet taken place. It is now two days or three days after the signing of the peace agreement and that could not be but that could start very soon.

**Q:** You said that you would be going to Darfur to talk with the government and the Walis [*SRS* Pronk: ... and with others] yes. So, the Janjaweed; who is going to tell them to stop fighting? Is it the government?

**SRS** Pronk: I always – and I said that before in a meeting – believe the government when they say, “Well we can not control everybody”. They make a distinction between those who they can control and those who they can not control. I think that is logical. Some they could control in the past and they can not control nowadays anymore. I think that is the responsibility of the government – but that is looking backward.

Anyway, now there are militia which they can control and militia which they can not control. I use the word “Janjaweed” for militia that they can not control. I do not use the word “Janjaweed” for everybody. The militia that they can control, by the way, have also carried out major atrocities and human rights violations, etc. but they can be controlled. The government can instruct tribal leaders to contain their own militia to stop fighting. That is the duty of the government; it is the duty of the Walis; it is the duty of the tribal leaders to do what the government says and it is the duty of these militias to lay down their weapons and not to use them anyway.

And then there is the Janjaweed which is out of control. They have to be stopped. The government is obliged to come with a plan of how to do so. This is part of the DPA. And that should not be a fake plan because we have seen fake plans in the past. It should be a real plan.

In one of the last phases of the talks, that problem of what to do with the Janjaweed had not yet been addressed properly and another issue had not been addressed properly either. That was the question: what to do with the SLM forces. Do they have to go home or can they be integrated in one way or another into the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). But if you read the text of the DPA, and that is something which I always advocated in my discussions in Abuja, link to it. SLA forces now are also going to be incorporated into the army. Which means that now there is a joint interest of army and SLM forces being incorporated, in stopping the Janjaweed. So it is not only the government which can not itself control it but also the SLM which has to take them. That is the theoretical concept. Of course it has to be done in practice and you need, in my view, also a strengthening of the peacekeeping force – AMIS for the time being – in order to help. This can not be done overnight. What can be done overnight is the implementation of the instruction to the militia which are under control to stop, stop, stop, so that everybody who is not following the instructions of the government is being seen as violating, non-implementing or as Janjaweed.

**Q:** The problem with the African Union in the past was the mandate. Do you think, Mr. Pronk, that the Darfur Peace Agreement gives a strong mandate to the African Union or a United Nations peacekeeping force to protect the civilians whether they are still residing in the camps or want to return to their places of origin?

My second question is that the Darfur situation even after peace is much worse than in southern Sudan which at least has some oil to fund their programs. Will there be any kind of conference like the Oslo conference for Darfur?

**SRSB Pronk:** Thank you.

The African Union Peace & Security Council is going to have meeting on Monday and they will have to take a decision about their mandate. And as far as I am concerned, the most important element of the mandate is to protect civilians. They have to keep the peace, they have to monitor the agreement, and they have to protect the people – the people without weapons. Any mandate which is not, in the present situation in Darfur, oriented first and foremost to the protection of civilians, will be beyond the mark.

Number two; yes. I am working on a transition and that is a transition from relief to recovery. We have to stop – not overnight – the major orientation on humanitarian assistance and relief work and to go for recovery assistance and then to development. You remember one of my contributions to these press conferences saying that people are fine because of humanitarian assistance, however they are not poor. So everything is depending on humanitarian assistance. You have to take away the poverty so that people can either produce food for themselves or earn enough money to buy the food from the market.

Recovery is necessary, we are working on it. There will be a recovery fund and there will be a first pledging conference either in September or October. There was a first meeting already the day after the signing, on Saturday morning, I was there, chaired by the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation who has come to Abuja to discuss, in particular, recovery questions and to set up a mechanism for it and, together with the United Nations, to prepare for a pledging conference.

I would say we have not done very well in the south. A lot of relief; a lot of talk about development in the long run but the recovery dimension has been wiped aside and I always deplored that. Many are responsible for that. In Paris, all countries came to the conclusion that we should not repeat that mistake as far as Darfur is concerned. I can say that.

**Q:** Last year, I understand from the Netherlands Ambassador, that the Netherlands has some kind of [*indiscernible*] initiative. Would this be a revival of this initiative?

**SRSB Pronk:** That is more or less part of it. You need a coordinating mechanism. That was an idea of a long time ago. In the meantime there have been many coordinating groups started. Maybe there are too many groups at the moment which could do better if they would join forces and orient themselves to complete action rather than only talk.

**Q:** Compensations have turned into turning point in the talks and this has led some parties not to sign the agreement. The compensations will come in the form of development to the region through government or donor funds. Donors however have not met their obligations to the south and this may also reflect on the Abuja agreement. Can the role of the donors reflect on the talks with some parties pointing out that the donors have not met their pledges and will it constitute a pressure card that will hinder the process?

**SRSB Pronk:** I don't know whether the interpretation was correct because the last sentence was the donors did not help Darfur with reconstruction which still has to start. I don't know whether I got your question right but let me answer a couple of things.

Firstly; in Darfur you have reconciliation exercises and part of the reconciliation is the compensation – the 'blood money'. Blood-money compensation has to be given to a victim by the person or the institution which afflicted the pain. If a third party is taking over then you can continue making pain because you don't have to pay for it. So compensation has to be paid for by those who did it. That is if I beat you to pieces – which I can not – and I am being penalized and you are going to pay him the money; that is not my penalty. That is what the Sudanese understand very well because I had many discussions in Darfur on tribal reconciliations. The problem is that some of the tribes for instance don't have enough money to compensate. That is a problem and you have to organize it for instance by creating funds and the government is very creative by the way.

Compensations, sir, can never be given by outsiders somewhere far from the country. Never. It would not be authentic. That is number one.

Number two: Did the donors not do their job in the south. I am critical on donors but, please, humanitarian assistance to the south has been tremendous; development assistance has been promising but can not be spent right away because there is not enough capacity in the south to do so. The problem is reconstruction – the quick-fix, which is necessary. I have made many proposals to the government and to the SPLM on how to deal with that. They wanted to use the World Bank and the World Bank is not good for quick reconstruction activities but that was their choice - don't blame the donors; blame the government and blame the SPLM for making their own choice. I am very straight. We at the United Nations made that very clear by the way and many donors deplored their decision. And we have said in Paris that it should be different and donors have said it is going to be different. And pledges have been made also now for reconstruction – I have just mentioned that. For instance, the Dutch example but that is just one of those examples.

Compensations have to be given by tribes in the form of reconciliation activities which has to take place in the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue. That is number one.

Secondly; the government has promised money. I think there is a figure of 30 million dollars – a small figure but anyway the principal is there. It is in the DPA. And I did say something else: I said that the government was willing to sign an attachment with a higher figure if AbdulWahid would have stayed. So, please, compensation is there to stay as an issue.

At the same time, sir, what is compensation? I am not speaking about compensation for human loss. It is hard to think that can be compensated with money but that is a discussion of course. But compensation because your house was burnt down and your water points were spoilt, etc.

You can only be compensated by a new house; by a new clinic; by new water points. You can call it compensation and you can also call it reconstruction of the house; the reconstruction of the water points; the reconstruction of the schools and the reconstruction of the villages in itself is a form of compensation. So don't make it too much of a distinction between the two. They are less distinguished than negotiators sometimes think.

Some of the negotiators had promised to the people in camps that “we will go to Abuja and get you individual money; you will all get some money.” They have made promises on their own initiative. When they said that the expectation of their people are not being met, they are responsible because they had created expectations about, which they could have known from the very beginning only for political reasons by the way to buy a constituency, that they could not be met. It is not so important to give 1,000 dollars to people. It is much more important to make it possible – that is compensation – that they get a house again, that their children could go to school again, that they get seeds and tools in order to start all over their agricultural activities and that they can live there securely. It means also peacekeeping. That is compensation/ reconciliation.

**Q:** Thank you for the second chance.

You said that the Janjaweed can now not be controlled. All United Nations Security Council Resolutions issued in the past accuse the government of backing the Janjaweed. Can I now write a news headline reading that “Jan Pronk now asserts that accusations levied against the Sudan government of backing the Janjaweed were incorrect”?

**SRSG Pronk:** Would you repeat the question? It is a clever question so that I can give you a clear answer. Which accusation are you referring to?

**Q:** I am referring to what you said about the Janjaweed being uncontrollable. Are the past accusations of Sudan government supporting the Janjaweed untrue and baseless?

**SRSG Pronk:** But that is not in one word.

I blamed the government that in 2003 and 2004 they had used militia, including Janjaweed, to fight the rebels. The government could have decided to use the army and the army alone – they didn’t. Of course, the army has done things that they shouldn’t do but anyway the army is under control. At a certain moment, Popular Defense Forces militia and the Janjaweed are beyond control. They get support; they get weapons and they get money – you start something and you can’t control it. So I blame the government for that. To that extent, sir, the criticism on the government is correct that I share with you. That’s the past.

Now we have to say to the government “stop it”. The government can stop part it – some militia they can control. They have to do it. My criticism on the government was that they didn’t. They did not stop them. They have to do that now. They gave them instructions on Saturday and I am pleased that they did it and will see to it whether they are implemented.

The other group and I have always also in these press conferences, said that some people were at a certain moment beyond control. You can blame the government for not stopping the militia; you can blame the government for having given freeway to everybody; you must help the government to stop those people who are now beyond the control of the government alone.

**Spokesperson Elkoussy** I thank the SRSG and I thank members of the press for coming here again. Thank you and see you soon.