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CJMC PRESS CONFERENCE

Below is a near verbatim transcript of the first press briefing of the CJMC featuring United Nations Force Commander Lt. Gen. Jasbir Singh Lidder, SAF Representative Brg. Gen. Hussein Ali Kambal and SPLA Representative Brg. Gen. Marc Paul held on the 26th March 2006 at United Nations Mission in Sudan Headquarters, Ramsis.

Spokesperson Elkoussy: Thank you for coming to our press briefing today.

I am honored to present our Force Commander Lieutenant-General Jasbir Lidder and our guest speakers Brigadier-General Hussein Ali Kambal of the Sudanese Armed Forces and Brigadier-General Marc Paul of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army.

We will start first with a presentation by our Force Commander and then we open the floor to questions from the press.

Again, we welcome our distinguished guests here and I turn the floor now to our Force Commander.

Force Commander Lidder: Thank you very much.

It is an honor for us to be here along with the two senior members of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) to whom you have just been introduced.

As you know, the CJMC is the body which monitors the implementation of the CPA and it meets every fortnight on the 2nd or the 4th Tuesday of the month and it has been meeting regularly - this is one structure which has been meeting regularly - has met 25 times so far including an emergency meeting which we had.

I would just take two or three minutes to give you certain highlights on the progress of the implementation of the CPA and request thereafter the senior members of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) to say a few words in their opening remarks and then take on any questions that you may have.

Incidentally, I must tell you that this is the first joint press conference that we have held of the CJMC and it was basically at the request of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) because they felt that the whole body must seek an advance forum and act as a platform to convey the positive spirit in which the CPA is being implemented so that any inhibitions on the part of anybody would be removed.

Just a few words on the implementation of the CPA: as of now, the redeployment of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) from south Sudan to the north is going on track. We have about 40% of the strength which has moved up although some of it has to be verified because some movements took place before the UN Military Observers got deployed on the ground.

As for the CPA, as of 9th July, 50% of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) troops are required to redeploy north of the line 1.1.'56. I am sure that when the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) senior member speaks to you, he will confirm to you that they intend to meet the deadline.

As far as the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) movement is concerned, we had a very historic movement starting from three, five days back when the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA), during the Phase I, had started redeploying from eastern Sudan towards southern Sudan.

Why I say it is historic is because this movement is being coordinated and monitored in a very joint and a very coordinated manner by both the Parties as well as the UN. We got all the figures over and there are 2,000 people plus and a large body of major equipment moving down to the south which includes about 13 tanks, 4 APCs and a lot of large guns. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) has provided a lot of logistic support for this movement and I visited this convoy at Kosti itself and for your knowledge and to show you the level in which they are moving, we will flash before you some photographs taken of this movement and will give you some photographs also for your carrying so that it will give you a little feedback of how this movement is taking place.

These photographs are from the Kassala area when the convoy started moving as well as in Kosti the convoy split up in two parts.

Thank you very much.

However, as I brought up in the last press conference, there are a few areas which remain of concern to us and these I have already highlighted in the second CPC meeting – the third one, actually, because the second one there was a problem in it's holding and this is going to be held tomorrow.

Mainly the points of concern are the integration of the OAGs which have realigned themselves after 9th March about whose incorporation remains a problem because the Other Armed Groups Collaborative Committee (OAGCC) has not met so far. This is a point of concern and we will be flagging it for the CPC.

Secondly; the formation and bringing in deployment of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) remains far behind schedule and this is one area which is of concern.

The last concern, of course, is the movement of the forces to the Assembly Areas which was supposed to be completed nearly two, three months back; which is well behind schedule. And

until the forces move into the Assembly Areas, we will not be able to fully monitor and audit their movements.

These are my opening remarks and I will hand you over first to Brigadier-General Hussein Ali Kambal who is the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) senior member of the CJMC and Brigadier-General Marc Paul who is the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) senior member of the CJMC.

Thank you.

Brig. Gen. Kambal: Welcome fellow pressmen and *salaam alaikum* [greetings].

First of all, we at the CJMC work as a team to monitor the implementation of the Security Arrangements stated in the CPA. I will speak about the developments from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) side as we implement the Security Arrangements starting with the redeployment to north of the 1.1.'56 line.

This is supposed to take place in five phases with the first phase covering redeployment of 17% and starting from 9.1.2005 and ending in 9.7.2005. We have carried this out by 100%.

Phase II is to cover 14% of the total number of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) forces. We had 46,403 Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) personnel who are supposed to be redeployed from southern Sudan after deducting the numbers required for the JIUs in the Three Areas that is 12,000 from a total of 46,403. 14% of this stage has been implemented from 9.7 – 9.1.2002 (?)

Phase III covers 19% thus meaning that 50% of the total number of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) forces in southern Sudan should have redeployed north of the 1.1.'56 line by 9.7.2006. Right now, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) has redeployed more than 40,000 – that is 73% - of its forces from southern Sudan excluding those to join the JIUs. If we count the 12,000 members of the JIUs who will be present in the south, this percentage will rise to up to 60% and we still have more than 71 days for this phase.

The second point I would like to talk about is the Assembly Areas. These are areas where the forces are supposed to assemble ahead of redeployment north of the 1.1.'56 line. To date we have implemented this by 100% in all these areas.

There is also the issue of the JIUs which is part of the Security Arrangements. We at the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) have nominated officers to these. That is to say that we have completed nominating 100% of our 12,000 officers who are to be part of the JIUs to be deployed in southern Sudan. On the ground, however, we are nearing 50 and more are coming in. Note that there is a difference between nominations and the forces on the ground. And it is our hope that during the coming days or period of one month or more we will have all that number on the ground.

On eastern Sudan, as noted by Mr. Chairman [*of the CJMC*] the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) was supposed to withdraw 100% of its forces from eastern Sudan by 9.1.2006. this was delayed probably due to administrative purposes and, thanks to God, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) has contributed with logistics and administrative support to help in the withdrawal of their vehicles and this was carried out in full coordination as mentioned by Mr.

Chairman [*of the CJMC*]. The first convoy has left for Kosti and from there to southern Sudan. This is the first phase and the others will follow with the same support until all these forces are withdrawn from eastern Sudan.

With the withdrawal of the last convoy of Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) troops from eastern Sudan, the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) will have over the area to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in the presence of the UN. Consequently, following the last phase of Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) withdrawal, eastern Sudan will be in the hands of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).

If I am allowed to say something about the Other Armed Groups (OAGs) as this is part of the Security Arrangements, there are armed groups aligned to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and as part of the Security Arrangements, a list of these forces has been drafted and presented [*to the CJMC*] and, indeed we have integrated more than 6,000 of these forces into the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the rest of these will be reintegrated as per the CPA into the police, prisons, wildlife and civil society and the rest will be subjected to the DDR program.

This, in short, are my opening remarks. Thank you.

Brg. Gen. Marc Paul: Good evening ladies and gentlemen; I am privileged here to be one of you today to brief you about the progress of the CPA or the ceasefire implementation modalities.

First, I will start with the process of redeployment south to north of the 1.1.'56 border as stipulated in the CPA. The process has been slow for some time but as a committee we have managed to work together at least to push for this process and as I am talking now there is a little bit of progress and the percentage as stated by the Chairman [*of the CJMC*] had some numbers which were not verified because the committees by then were not available. The Sudan government and the SPLM had not formed the committees at that time and the forces were being redeployed. We will still verify these figures. So there is progress on that side.

The second is the issue of redeployment from north to south of border 1.1.'56 that is from eastern Sudan. We were supposed to be out of this area by 9th of January 2006 but due to logistics problems, we could not meet the timeline as stated in the CPA.

However, we have started the withdrawal from eastern Sudan and that redeployment will be in 3 phases. The first phase is the one that started on the 21st of April and which we think will end by the 30th of this month and will continue up to the 15th of next month May. And then we will have the third phase in June. That will give us the total redeployment of forces of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) from the area of eastern Sudan to the areas of southern Sudan.

As stated by my colleague Kambal, as we leave, the areas will be handed back to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) as was agreed according to the CPA.

The 3rd issue is the movement of troops to the Assembly Areas. We are also working on that; moving troops to the Assembly Areas in southern Sudan as well as the areas of the Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains.

The 4th issue; there are some few remarks that we put on the issue of security. On 7th of March there was an incident that took place in the area of Abyei and these are some of the issues that we think are some setbacks to the CPA because some officers of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) or forces aligned to them ambushed an armless convoy of people who were moving from Khartoum here to Bahr-el-Ghazal. The only thing that we think should happen supposing such incidents happen is that anybody who is a criminal must be brought to book. But on these actions, the officer is still at large and we are handling this case in a mature way. Otherwise it is a great setback to the implementation [*of the CPA*] because killing about 11 people including children whom we are supposed to protect – and we think that if the war has ended then there is no need of children dying; why should they die again? It was during the war when such atrocities were being committed and nobody is going to be spared even if he commits any problems during the war, still he will not be spared.

On the issue of the Other Armed Groups, we think that the CPA has a certain timeline or timeframe for everything and as a committee we said some times back and we say it now that this issue of Other Armed Groups should have an end. There was a certain date which was set that any Other Armed Group should choose to align itself to either of the armies and as of 9th of March, we think that anybody who should claim to be calling himself an armed group because they were being used by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) during the war but we think now there is no war so why should they be existing now because the government has not right now to spend money [*on such groups*] because they were a counter-insurgency but now it seems there is no insurgency and there is no need of them existing so they should be disbanded and we think that anybody who does not align himself to either forces should now be declared a bandit and should be dealt with by the apparatus of the state.

The final thing that I would also like to put along because it is connected also to the security is the problem of the LRA in southern Sudan. This issue of the LRA is causing us problems and causing problems of insecurity to the population and even preventing refugees from returning from the neighboring countries and is even displacing some people, as we are talking now, from their home areas to come to the town.

We think that the issue of the LRA is a concern of security and the Government of South Sudan has offered to mediate between the LRA and the Ugandan government. The second option was to ask them to leave the borders of Sudan because they have nothing to do; they are not fighting a war against us but fighting against the government of Uganda so they should go and fight in Uganda. The third option is maybe if they don't accept these, then the Government of South Sudan may declare war against them to eject them out of its borders.

These, in short, is what I would say and thank you.

Spokesperson Elkoussy: We thank the leading members of the CJMC and now invite questions from the press.

Q: My first question is to Brg. Gen. Marc. Mr. Pronk said that if UNMIS had been informed about the movement of the convoy from that place to Abyei this incident would have been avoided. Why didn't you inform the UNMIS?

The second question is to Brg. Gen. Kambal. Why did the Government of Sudan reject the involvement of UNMIS in the investigation concerning the incident in Abyei?

Thank you.

Brg. Gen. Marc: As a process, because peace is a process and we wanted to involve and bring everybody on board, the SPLM and the Government of Southern Sudan led by the SPLM which is the ruling party in southern Sudan, try to bring everybody on board and they managed to persuade the SSDF and as of then they joined us, according to the declaration as of January 2006.

We have been doing the process of integration and at that time they really did not know the system and the mechanisms of the CPA and some of them are not really aware what are the procedures. The CJMC is there in Juba and Khartoum is not a Ceasefire Zone and is beyond the boundaries of the CJMC. We were there in Juba and did not know what was happening and were just surprised that an incident occurred. And also moving without prior notification does not lead to killing. You could otherwise stop him and say you just wait here because we need to get notification. That does not involve lives if you need only to instruct someone but not kill him. We think that this is not the time for killing.

Thank you.

Brg. Gen. Kambal: I think the question should have been: why did the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), and not the Government of Sudan, reject UN involvement in the investigations.

Q: Well I asked you the question because you are from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).

Brg. Gen. Kambal: Yes, because I am from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) but your question was why the Government of Sudan did reject UN involvement. This is not an issue but I was just clarifying so that you know you are referring to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).

On the Abyei incident; as mentioned by Mr. Pronk, these forces were moving from Kharasana until they reached Abyei without informing the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) or the UN despite the fact that we do have an agreement that any movement should be notified 1 week ahead in order to facilitate verification but this did not take place.

Two; the movement was being carried out at night and we in the military are aware that any night movement has its implications in military terms.

Coming to the question. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) formed a commission of inquiry into the incident and investigations are underway and whatever party or individual is found guilty will be brought to book. We said that the investigations in the area will be carried out the military way and the guilty party brought to book once proven. This does not mean that the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) could not be a party to the investigation in the area committee.

As for UNMIS with which we do joint work, it did the monitoring and presented its report and then the CJMC and we will carry out the investigations and bring the guilty party to book once we find proof of guilt.

The Abyei incident is not the only one that involved killing following the signing of the CPA. There are more than one incidents and all were either handled as a police case or

administrative measures taken. And all these were violations from the part of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA). So the Abyei incident is not the only incident and there is no need to raise it as an issue. This is a normal occurrence just as are the other violations which involved loss of life on the part of soldiers, armed groups and civilians.

So I assure you that investigations are underway and we have not yet closed the issue.

Q: I was referring to the UN as a neutral body that came to Sudan to be between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA). If there are incidents then the UN surely has to be involved. So my question is that Mr. Jan Pronk had reported that the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) has rejected a UN involvement into the investigations.

Brg. Gen. Kambal: The UN carried out investigation into the incident as part of a joint team. We did not reject the UN investigating. The UN did indeed carry out an investigation and raised a report or pointed out to one saying that such and such an incident took place as per a briefing of the chairman of the committee and, as an advanced step, a commission of inquiry was formed and the process is going on with the UN as an observer. The UN is basically an observer and has started its monitoring functions.

But as for the investigation and whatever follows thereof is an internal issue just as happened in earlier incidents.

Q: I have two questions: one to Lt. Gen. Jasbir and the other to Brg. Gen. Marc Paul.

Lt. Gen., now the last Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) redeployment [*from eastern Sudan*] will be in June and the place will be taken over by the SAF. What guarantee is there that the SAF and the Eastern Front will not clash? Is there a guarantee that they will not clash?

The second question is to Brg. Gen. Marc Paul. The question of the LRA in southern Sudan is becoming a headache and is almost a song that can not end. Almost one part is now becoming almost a song. What are the dates or timeframe given to the LRA to either go out of southern Sudan or be forced out? Are they in a position to negotiate with the Uganda Government?

Lt. Gen. Lidder: Thank you.

The UN is definitely concerned about the security situation in eastern Sudan on the pullout of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA). We believe that a political settlement with the Eastern Front and the Government of Sudan must be reached so that we don't have any adverse security situation after the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) redeploys from there.

The UN on the political plain is facilitating talks with the Eastern Front so that a suitable agreement is reached but the primary responsibility of the security in eastern Sudan will rest with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) because the Government of Sudan, after the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) redeploys from eastern Sudan, it is the responsibility of the Government of Sudan.

We do hope that politically a solution is reached with the Eastern Front and we are very sure that the Government of Sudan along with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) will ensure that

there is a proper security situation in eastern Sudan after the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) pulls out.

Brg. Gen. Marc: I think I stated earlier that we have three options and these three options are always a process because if we say that we have to mediate, maybe not the army but the Government of Southern Sudan trying to mediate, we will give them a chance – we don't know – because when we came to an agreement, we did not set dates as to how and when we are going to reach an agreement with the Government of Sudan but finally we did reach an agreement. If they know the change now, the trend, they should also think twice of coming to their senses and accept to negotiate or else the two other options can be taken. But we are first giving the option of the government [*of southern Sudan*] being offering to mediate and it is will be upon the government to say whether we are not able to break through and then the last options will be considered.

Q: My question will be shared to both the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).

On Sunday the 16th of April, the SPLM Secretary-General alleged that some elements within the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) are still supporting the LRA rebels in continuing to cause instability in southern Sudan. My question which is for the benefit of the Sudanese public and the international community is: what are the proofs that the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) are still helping the LRA to continue to cause instability in southern Sudan?

And to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), when these allegations were uttered, there has been no response from you people and it seems as people say, “silence could mean total acceptance or total disagreement”. We do not know exactly what your response to this particular allegation is. Are you in total conformity with that particular allegation or do you have something to clarify to the Sudanese people and the international community.

Also back to the SPLM/A. The LRA once announced that they are ready to start negotiations with the Uganda Government in order to end atrocities in Uganda and southern Sudan but to the contrary, they continue to massacre innocent civilians in southern Sudan and northern Uganda. How are you going to handle this case? You have said you have offered to mediate while to the contrary what they announced over the BBC that they were going to surrender and start to negotiate with the Uganda Government never happened. Don't you think that the same scenario will not repeat itself?

Thank you.

Brg. Gen. Kambal: I am surprised by the SPLM's statement that the SAF supports the LRA in causing insecurity in the south. It is more surprising that such allegations come out of a such a responsible person and we hope that he has the evidence.

All or most of their military operations are launched from SPLM-controlled areas. The SAF has no presence in the areas where the LRA has launched attacks on SPLA, civilian or even United Nations sites as was the case in Yambio in Western Equatoria. The SAF does not have a single soldier in Western Equatoria and the LRA now operates in Western Equatoria. So how can we support forces operating in Western Equatoria where we do not have a presence? The same applies to the other areas [*where the LRA is active*] and anyone who makes such allegations should come up with the evidence.

Thank you.

Brg. Gen. Marc: On the issue of the LRA, yes there have been so many initiatives with the government of Uganda and the LRA but most of these initiatives failed maybe due to the issue of confidence as they don't trust themselves. We come in here as a third party because, yes you know that the LRA sometimes back has been fighting us during the hour and was being used by the Sudan government as a counterinsurgency to fight us in Sudan and then they also achieve their second objective of fighting in Uganda. But now we know that they are still committing problems; committing atrocities. My colleague in the SAF can not deny today that they had been supporting them. It is today which I don't know but sometimes back during the war and before the signing of the CPA, the LRA was being supported by the SAF.

With all these claims that these people [*the LRA*] is operating within territories controlled by someone, what remains and what lies in front of us is the Sudan because even if they operate in areas ... because if we have signed an agreement and are sitting together as we are sitting now, then there is no need of saying that these people are operating on either side. They are operating in Sudan and we should treat them like enemies of Sudan and have no right to say that these people are operating in those areas. The people who are suffering are Sudanese citizens and it is our work as the two armies of Sudan to ensure security so we should not claim that this problem is happening on this or that direction.

We try to encourage them to at least accept ... we will give them our experience of how you can at least control yourself as somebody who has been a guerilla. Because our case is different; we are not terrorists like the LRA and we were fighting a just war. But we will give them courage so they could at least take that courage and come to a negotiation. We will tell them that we came out with this experience. If they were really fighting for a just cause, then we think they will accept our advice.

Q: Concerning the armed factions neither aligned to the SAF nor the SPLA, the Secretary-General of the SPLM accused parties which he did not name of inciting such factions not to join any of the two forces with the aim of causing a state of insecurity in the south. In your view, what are the obstacles before these factions that prevent them from joining any of the two forces?

Brg. Gen. Kambal: With regards the Other Armed Groups as the CPA calls them; most of these factions were operating alongside the SAF in the past. After the signing of the CPA and the south-south dialogue and in line with the CPA, some of these groups and parts of some of these factions chose to align themselves with the SPLA while part of these groups are still aligned to the SAF. As I mentioned before, we are listing the groups aligned to us and will hand over the list to the CJMC which is chaired by the United Nations.

Any faction that is neither aligned to us nor to the SPLA will be considered a renegade group.

On what you said about accusations by the Secretary-General of some parties inciting the factions not to join either group, we do not speak in mysteries; if there is anything, the person must be clear and say 'Hussein Kambal is inciting such and such a group not to join the forces and to become a renegade faction'. This has not happened and we control the factions aligned to us. As I mentioned in the beginning, we have reintegrated more than 6,000 of these into the SAF and the rest will be reintegrated into the police, prisons and wildlife forces and

the remaining will join the civil service and the others will be subject to the DDR program and reintegrated into civilian life.

Q: SPLA Chief of Staff Wayay Deng says that the SAF has transferred an SPLA officer called Lorok to Lafon and says that this is contrary to the CPA and the Security Arrangements.

He also said that someone called Ismail Konye was also secretly taken by the SAF to its areas.

Secondly; some SPLA officers say that all LRA attacks were launched from areas where there is a heavy SAF presence and that the SAF officers who were supporting the LRA are still at large.

Thirdly; militia activities – be they those that are aligned to the SAF such as Gordon’s forces or aligned to the SPLA in the Nassir area where there was a problem – who is responsible for the problems that occurred between the militia forces aligned to the SAF and those aligned to the SPLA?

Brg. Gen. Marc: On this issue of Lorok, it is clear that Peter Lorok is one of the SPLA officers – he is a Lieutenant-Colonel in the SPLA – and, in accordance to the CPA, he should not change sides as of 9th of January 2005. Because if we keep on changing sides then at the end we will not know any agreement.

We think that this officer was smuggled by members of a certain elements of the security from his home area of Chukdum to Torit, from Torit to Juba and from Juba to Khartoum. He is currently here in Khartoum and we have been requesting the SAF to hand over this officer to his post. This is what the agreement says and we think that it is really appropriate to be returned so that we stick to what we have agreed.

On the issue of the Secretary-General, I can not speak for the Secretary-General. I think it is very clear he has stated what he has stated and he means it. So I don’t need to speak for him.

Thank you.

Brg. Gen. Kambal: Follow up to the answer by my brother, first of all, Ismail Konye who is claimed to have been flown secretly from Juba to Pibor is a Major-General in the Sudan Armed Forces and everybody knows that. We can take him to Juba or bring him to Khartoum to carry out his job for the SAF.

On the LRA attacks as mentioned by Mr. Wayay Deng who said that all these attacks were being carried out from areas of SAF presence, I did talk of the issue a few minutes ago and there is no need for me to go through it again.

On the officer Peter Lorok, in our meeting about a quarter of an hour ago, brother Marc also raised the issue of this officer who he says belongs to the SPLA and has been transported by the SAF to its areas. We have just recorded the details and will investigate. If we confirm that the officer is yours and escaped to join us, then he will be returned. And if he is one of ours then of course we will not return him. We would like to draw attention to the incident in Dinidiro where a group of the Popular Defense Forces defected with a joint faction of the

SPLA and raided the offices of the security forces in Dindiro. They broke into the armory and stole all the weapons there and then went on and banded up in Kurmuk in SPLA-held area. We have requested through the committee in Damazeen that they be handed over to us but they have not yet been handed over.

There are a lot of similar incidents and we do not want to delve into that.

Q: I have two questions to the Lieutenant-General: the CPA stopped the war in the country. The United Nations forces are supposed to support the peace process but in this press conference and through what we have just heard from the two honorable gentlemen from the SAF and the SPLA, it seems that there is a great lack of trust. This language is very clear and we do hear of different things from the statements of politicians. Doesn't this clear air of lack of trust worry between the two parties worry you? To what extent can this affect the future of the peace process in Sudan?

Secondly; Osama Bin Laden has now cited Sudan as one of his areas of concern and has talked of war in Sudan or the sneaking in of his fighters into the Sudan. He also criticized the peace process in the south and talked of the situation in Darfur. To what extent do you think that this AlQaeda issue will affect the future of the peace process in Sudan?

Thank you.

Lt. Col. Lidder: Thank you very much.

The first question is about the distrust in the statements made by the two members of the CJMC. Let me emphasize as to what a difficult task it is here to implement the CPA between two factions which have been at war for a very, very long period. Please look at the positive side that the CPA is going well on track. There are bound to be differences and these differences must be aired openly and frankly – we appreciate that. In fact, in the CJMC, we encourage both parties to put across their points of view. It is better to disagree and talk together frankly so that we can find mutually acceptable solutions rather than put up a façade to you that everything is going on well while at the backyard things are going wrong.

Let me tell you, we must appreciate that both the Brigadier-Generals here are speaking from their heart and that telling you what they feel does not mean that this is going to be an obstacle in the implementation of the CPA. We have on many occasions, looking at the positive sides, defused the situations. In many places there were potential areas of conflict such as in eastern Sudan, in Halufka (?), Pibor all were areas of flashpoints. Except an odd operation in Abyei which also you must appreciate did not escalate into any more violence, both sides showed a lot of maturity.

I think the CPA is well on track and I, as the Chairman of the CJMC, am quite convinced and that is why we are all sitting here together and this is to assure you and members of the CJMC to please take the frank comments by both the parties at face value. They are committed; everybody is committed to the implementation of the CPA and what we are telling you here is the genuine feelings of both parties and both parties have a stand – they have been at war with each other; they have genuine differences – and we try to find mutually acceptable solutions to it and *inshalla*, as I keep saying, we will move on track; we don't have any doubts about that.

The second part is about *AlQaeda* and Osama Bin Laden. I am only a military force commander and will not delve into other territory but it has been clarified again and again about Darfur and the Assistant Secretary-General who was here that the United Nations will take the Government of Sudan into confidence and will ask the permission of the Government of Sudan for any initiative that it will take on Darfur.

As far as *AlQaeda* is concerned, all I would like to say is that it is an equal threat to everybody and not only to the United Nations. I am sure the Government of Sudan, and the people of Sudan will equally value it and we will take the statement at their face value. I would not like to get into a discussion over it. I am very sure that the situation [*indiscernible*]

Thank you.

Q: The Eastern Front says it will not allow the SAF to come into Hamesh Khoreib and the so-called “Liberated Areas”. Up to now no date has been set for the talks between the government and the Eastern Front. We have just heard from the two Brigadier-Generals that there will be a hand over [*of the areas of eastern Sudan from the SPLA to the SAF*]. How will the hand over take place while the Eastern Front has rejected a SAF presence in the area and is threatening war?

Brg. Gen. Kambal: On eastern Sudan as mentioned beforehand and confirmed by brother Marc and Mr. Chairman here, by the withdrawal of the last SPLA soldier from eastern Sudan during the third phase of redeployment in July, territory will be handed over to the SAF as responsibility for peace and security in all parts of Sudan, especially northern Sudan, is on the SAF.

As for the Eastern Front, it is not a party to the agreement but if there are any talks or political process being carried out and pending an agreement, the SAF remains responsible for security of the territory and the people of eastern Sudan. The presence of the Eastern Front does not prevent us from taking over the area.

Q: My first question is to the Brg. Gen. [*Hussein Ali Kambal*]. You said that the first phase of the 14% SAF redeployment from southern Sudan and the second phase of 17% have been implemented. You have until 9.7.2006, if I read you well, to carry out your obligations on redeployment. This means that you have realized about a third of your obligations on redeployment up to date of the about 46,000 as you mentioned. Is the remaining time enough to redeploy the remaining two-thirds of your forces?

Brg. Gen. Kambal: As I did mention before but will give you more details, the SAF in the three areas of southern Sudan – Equatoria, Bahr-el-Ghazal and Greater Upper Nile – number 46,403 officers and rank and file. Of this figure, 12,000 is supposed to be deducted for the JIUs. The remainder will be redeployed in 5 phases spanning a period of 30 months beginning from the date of signing of the CPA. The first phase covers 17% which we said we implemented 100%; the second phase that covers 14% has been carried out by 100%; phase 3 covers 19% which will then add up to 50% of our presence redeployed by 9.7.2006. At the moment we have realized more than 40% of our redeployment north and this excludes the 12,000 [*for the JIUs*]. If we take away the 12,000 which are to join the JIUs and are to remain in southern Sudan, this will take that percentage to more than 60% and we still remain with 70 more days to complete the third phase. By this time we may have redeployed 80% of our forces. We are now in phase 3 and still have 70 more days to go.

I would like to assure you that, by these phases, we are supposed to redeploy north of the 1.1.'56 line within 30 months. At the rate we are moving, *inshalla*, within a period of less than 4 months we would have implemented up to Phase IV and would be going into Phase V of our deployment and thus be ahead of the obligations laid by the CPA. There is no delay and to the contrary we are even ahead of the timeline of the CPA.

Q: My second and last question is to Brg. Gen. Marc.

The DDR program is a very important component for the sustainability of the CPA. Can you give us an idea of how it is going on in southern Sudan now?

Brg. Gen. Marc: You know that most of this process always involves money. And when you talk of money then you need now to start from the national level until you reach the level of southern Sudan and also the donor community.

The committees are there; there is a DDR committee in the north and another in the south which are supposed to be dealing with the incorporation and reintegration of ex-combatants to civil society and to the civil institutions and other forces.

They could not start as planned according to the timeframe of the CPA but they have now started. They first started with the demobilization of child soldiers which has reached to a certain percentage of at least 50% and now they are registering the ex-combatants and with this registration now they will identify those whom they will demobilize. Then that process will go on as they get the money. According to the information I got, I am not a member of the DDR commission, but according to the briefing I got from them, they have a problem of funding as they are now but they are starting slowly, slowly and hopefully we will get support from both the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan and the international community.

Thank you.

Q: Thanks for the opportunity once again. My last question goes to the representative of the SAF.

Political parties and the people of Sudan have been complaining of the presence of the Peoples' Defense Forces (PDF) due to the fact that the CPA does not allow any middle forces. You have spoken about later on some people will be demobilized – will be part of the DDR process. For the wellbeing of the Sudanese people, will the PDF be involved in that since the political parties and the people of Sudan have been calling for the PDF to be dissolved because the CPA doesn't involve any middle force?

The last is the presence of militia forces in Western Bahr-el-Ghazal. The commanding chief of the militia forces in Western Bahr-el-Ghazal said that he and his forces will never join the SPLA. We don't know at the present whether they are part of the SAF? Are they still part of your forces since they are standing on their own at the moment? This point needs to be clarified to the people of Sudan and the international community in order to see to it that the CPA is on the right track and going on well for the wellbeing of the Sudanese people.

Thank you very much.

Brg. Gen. Kambal: Concerning the Other Armed Groups as mentioned and as the PDF has been classified as part of these, the PDF, ladies and gentlemen, which is present in the areas of southern Sudan or in the 6 Ceasefire Areas excluding eastern Sudan, and not the PDF in northern Sudan – please differentiate between the two. The PDF in southern Sudan is no different than the OAGs – aligned to the SAF, if it is so aligned - and will be subjected to the same process as the other OAGs; some of it will be reintegrated into the SAF and the remainder follows the program we mentioned.

As for the groups, people should not be much concerned on the issue because there are a program set for the issue and there are committees and a collaborative committee and once these committees set to work there will be no fear and these will not constitute a threat to security. It is our hope that these committees set to work in order that it proceeds with the implementation of the Security Arrangements.

Allow me to say a few more words. Despite the fact that the war span a long time between the two parties, but since a peace agreement was signed and this has been the choice of the people, we at the SAF are fully committed to the agreement and operate in full transparency. As mentioned earlier by one of the brothers here that there is distrust between the two parties, on our part there is trust and we operate in transparency and are committed to all clauses of the ceasefire and the evidence is clear from the answers and statements given here today.

It is our hope that the two parties work together in order not to give any chance to hamper the peace agreement and it is our hope that it continues under United Nations monitoring.

Thank you.

Brg. Gen. Marc: I just wanted to emphasize on this issue of trust. We are here only to solve problems and are not here to create problems.

We have fought enough and it is time now for us to solve things maturely. If there are problems, we will raise these problems but that does not show that there is a problem. We will not go back to war but will still fight these problems which are there within us.

There are people who are still not aware of this peace and they should be aware of this peace. This is also a process which is going and I want to assure the public that there is no problem and if we are having problems, these problems will be solved by the mechanism of the CPA.

The CPA gives everybody rights; it gives the citizen rights, it gives me rights and it gives everybody rights. We think that these problems will be overcome as time goes. There are no major problems; there are a few problems but we are working to try to put them aside and continue with the process.

The issue of OAGs, I think, is clear and there will be no group that will be operating outside the two armies in Sudan. So if there is anybody who thinks that maybe he is going to exist, then I don't think that the government of the day will still be giving its money to somebody who is doing nothing. So it is upon the government; if they still need to spend their money on nothing then it is upon them.

We think the CPA does not give any provision for any other to exist and if anybody thinks he can exist alone, then I think he will be a legitimate target for the government apparatus and

the Government of National Unity and the two armies – the SPLA and the SAF. If we all agree that he is a renegade, then he will be dealt with.

Spokesperson Elkoussy: We thank the leaders of the CJMC for coming here. Thank you very much.

There are two items you can take with you both in Arabic and English. So please help yourself.