

## Briefing Paper on ABYEI Area

### 5<sup>th</sup> August 2010

#### 1. Background

- Abyei is a bridge between North and South, and most people believe that it is the frontier for both conflict and unity and will define whether the CPA succeeds or fails.
- Between 2004 and 2008, there was a total of 18 282 returnees in Abyei of which 8 282 were organized returns (organized by the government and community groups) whilst 10 000 were spontaneous. Following the 2008 fighting/violence and displacements, the government then organized return of 2 355 individuals in November/December 2009. Between January and June 2010 there an estimated 3000 people that spontaneously returned to Abyei.
- The Abyei area population is currently estimated to be between 80 000 and 100 000 (August 2010) and the government believes that another 75% is still displaced. The fighting in May 2008 displaced approximately 55 000, with about 50 000 Dinka Ngok people going to the South (mainly Agok) and also other Southern states such as Bentiu, Aweil and Wau. The other 5 000 who were Misseriya were displaced to the North, mainly Muglad. Prior to the May 2008 clashes, Abyei town had been suffering from overcrowding and poor water supply, sanitation and hygiene. This was because the population in the town had increased threefold following the signing of the CPA. This was made worse because there was no functional administration, and the people had to largely rely on the international community for basic services.
- The overall support strategy by the international community in Abyei is to meet the basic needs of returnees, host communities as well as the Misseriya nomads so as to lessen tension that may arise due to competition over scarce resources and basic services. Whilst historically the Misseriya and Dinka Ngok would have localized disputes, (largely relating to access to water and pastures); they managed to resolve these conflicts using traditional grassroots mechanisms. However, they now seem more polarized as political and CPA benchmarks are being implemented; with counter-accusations particularly relating to cattle raiding. Recent accusations now also include the allegations that some Misseriya groups are being sponsored to attack Dinka Ngok villages (e.g. Maker Abior on 12<sup>th</sup> June and Tajalei on 5<sup>th</sup> July). Given the polarization, it is even more critical that the basic humanitarian principles and approaches including "do no harm" are adhered to by the international community. The fragile relationships between the Dinka and the Misseriya has been worsened by weakened traditional peace and reconciliation mechanisms and a disenfranchised youth. This is being further exacerbated by the up-coming South Sudan Referendum and Abyei Referendum. On-going conflict-prevention and stabilization approaches will need to be maintained and further enhanced.
- The migration strategy for the 2009/10 entailed the following; (a) supporting the dissemination of information as well as dialogue with community leaders particularly on the PCA ruling on grazing rights, (b) identifying geographical areas of concern (including areas with nomads, returnee areas and migration corridors) and ensuring that such areas are closely monitored by Abyei police, JIUs and the JMTs, (c) improving safety and security as well as rule of law; (d) addressing competition over natural resources, particularly water. A key approach is to monitor existing water points and also ensure provision of water in nomadic settlements; (e) manage rumours as these have the potential to polarize underlying tensions.
- The traditional leaders (Chiefs) have attributed the relatively peaceful migration season in Abyei area, (the first after the PCA award) to the following (a) conferences/workshops on peaceful coexistence (b) formation of peace committees consisting of both Misseriya and Dinka Ngok, (c) engagement of the

Misseriya and Dinka Ngok chiefs, (d) Misseriya within SPLM structures were also reaching out to the other Misseriya, extending a hand of reconciliation, (e) exchange meetings between the Abyei Chief Administrator and the Muglad Commissioner and (f) increased role of the police including impact of 5 new police posts in geographical areas of concern along the migration corridors and 7 vehicles provided by UNDP. It should be noted that the Misseriya nomads were not allowed to cross into Unity State because of the no arms policy in that State.

## 2. Key contextual issues and challenges

### 2.1 Security and stability

- The security situation in Abyei remains fragile and unpredictable and in UN security phase 3 level 3. The security situation is closely related to the other challenges that are highlighted in the sections below; namely border demarcation following the PCA award; the coming referenda (especially Abyei referendum); migration and related tribal conflicts and (anticipated) returns.
- The CPA allows for three military elements within Abyei namely (a) UNMIS Military consisting of the military observers and Force Protection from Troops Contributing countries-TCC, (b) Joint Integrated Units –JIUs and (c) Abyei police – *previously referred to as JIPUs*. However, on the ground there are also Oil Police that are under the auspices of the Presidency. There are concerted efforts to ensure that JIUs that are composed of military from SAF and SPLA work together as integrated joint teams. There are similar efforts to ensure that Abyei Police (JIPUs) composed of North Police and South Sudan Police Service are integrated and work as joint teams. There are concerns regarding the allegiances of the members of JIUs and Abyei Police to their respective mother units (factions) in case of security disturbances. There is a need for the JIU and Abyei police leadership to be consciously aware of, and to disseminate to their subordinates, the critical need for impartiality and a non partisan approach in the discharge of duties to safe guard all residents of Abyei area.
- The UN Military is based in Team Site Abyei, and has 2 Temporary Operating Bases (TOBs) in Diffra (north) and Agok (south) respectively. The Abyei Area Security Committee has been active in monitoring the security situation and responding to any security threats, including following up reports of stolen cattle. The UN Military and civilian sections (including UN Police) in collaboration with the authorities have been actively monitoring the entire Abyei Area, particularly the return areas and migration routes.
- The AAA and SPLM/M and Dinka argue that the insecurity being experienced in Abyei area is (*allegedly*) being sponsored by non-Misseriya elements, including the attack this year in Marial Achak (3 killed), another in Maker Bior (1 killed) and the latest one that killed 8 people in Tajalei on 5<sup>th</sup> July. The attacks are *allegedly* being calculated to disrupt the border demarcation as well as the referendum, in addition to discouraging returns and depopulating Dinka Ngok villages. The Dinka argue that for decades there had been peaceful co-existence between the Dinka Ngok and Misseriya but *some* Misseriya people, whilst not master-minding the attacks were now being used to cause insecurity in Abyei.
- The Misseriya traditional leadership has meanwhile distanced themselves from organizing the attacks in Abyei. The Dinka Ngok and SPLA/M allege that the NCP and SAF were sponsoring the attacks in Abyei, arguing that the suspected PDF elements were created by an act of Parliament. There are allegations that the militias/PDF elements that attack Abyei pass through SAF bases and checkpoints without being stopped. It is argued that the attacks and other disturbances are an attempt to renegotiate the CPA and PCA which would be resisted. Because of the attacks, some civilians had

started arming themselves for self defense/protection, because the JIUs as well as the international community were unable to effectively protect them. Whilst originally the problem of armed civilians related to the Misseriya, there is now a new dimension where there are now also many Dinka Ngok civilians who are armed.

- AAA notes the role of the UN Military will be much more critical in this coming period more than any other period. The AAA has recommended that the numbers of UN military personnel should be increased and that the mandate should be expanded to operate under chapter 7 (rather than current chapter 6 of the UN Charter) to be able to effectively protect civilians.
- The AAA is also placing high emphasizes on strengthening the Abyei Police Force, both in terms of quantity and quality. In the month of July an additional 300 police officers were redeployed from Juba to Abyei to reinforce the current police strength in Abyei. The arrival of the 300 Police officers brings the total number of the Abyei Police (JIPUs) in Abyei to 641. The new arrivals will be posted within Abyei area in the existing police stations/posts. Abyei requires a total of 1000 police officers and the remaining 359 officers will be deployed from the north (i.e. Abyei citizens who have been residing in the north). There is also insecurity along the main road from Kadugili especially on the Southern Kordofan side, particularly the Higlig-Nyama stretch which is currently classified as Category D, meaning that it is high risk road which requires armed escorts for life saving missions. In March 2010, there were blockages of roads, makeshift roadblocks and looting of food aid convoys and passenger vehicles.
- There are isolated cases of insecurity in northern Abyei arising from disgruntled Misseriya who accuse the international community of inadequate humanitarian support. The latest incident was on 12th July when the JMT was stopped at a road block mounted by Misseriya Armed men 10 km North of Umm Khaer. The JMT was immediately surrounded by about 100 more men and 5 were seen with AK 47 rifles and most of the others were brandishing machetes. The group was hostile to the JMT and asked the JMT to go back and not return until and unless there their demands for humanitarian support. In October 2009, there also an incident when the JMT was surrounded and threatened by armed people, again demanding humanitarian support, arguing that more support was going to the southern parts of Abyei.

## **2.2 PCA award and related Border Demarcation**

- Some segments of the Misseriya are opposed to the PCA award and have vehemently opposed any border demarcation on the ground. Only 4 of the planned 26 beacons (pillars) have so far been erected (the distance between each pillar is 10km). A Misseriya meeting held in El Setab in April 2010 resolved that anyone attempting to demarcate the border as per PCA award should be attacked. During the AU High Level mission to Muglad in July (led by President Mbeki), Misseriya representatives stated their rejection of the PCA ruling and border demarcation, claiming that they were not consulted in the process. They argued that they never agreed to the PCA ruling, and claimed that the 1-1-56 is the legitimate boundary.
- Meanwhile, the SPLM and the Dinka Ngok community believe that the Misseriya are hijacking the demarcation process and that GoNU should do more to ensure demarcation, particularly because there had been a prior agreement between SPLM and NCP that the PCA award would not be contested by either party. After the PCA ruling was announced the two parties agreed to implement the decision. The Misseriya on the other hand argue that they were not fully engaged in the process and are therefore not bound by the PCA decision.
- In the last one month the Abyei residents organised peaceful protest/demonstration to press for key issues that include (a) the need to speed up formation of Abyei referendum commission and (b) the need for Abyei border demarcation on basis of PCA award.
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### **2.3 The Referenda**

- The Abyei referendum is taking a centre stage (and less of the North/South referendum). Whilst the Abyei Referendum law was passed in February 2010, the Referendum Commission is not yet in place due to disagreements that include the chairship. There are concerns/fears by the Dinka Ngok Community and SPLM that attempts to delay or even cancel the referendum for whatever reason would create major challenges, including possible return to conflict. There are accusations that the recent attacks on Dinka Ngok villages in Maker Abior (12 June) and Tajalei (5<sup>th</sup> July) were allegedly being sponsored by SAF and were an attempt to displace Dinka Ngok people from their villages ahead of the referendum and to also cause some conflict that would lead to cancelation of the Abyei referendum. The Dinka Ngok and SPLM believe that these are all attempts to renegotiate the CPA and PCA which they would not accept.
- Once the Abyei Referendum Commission is in place, a key issue they would need to quickly resolve is criteria for Abyei residency and therefore eligibility to vote. The Dinka Ngok and SPLM are of the view that only the Dinka Ngok should vote, together with the people from other tribes known to be staying in the 9 Dinka Ngok chiefdoms. Meanwhile, the Misseriya are of the view that they should all be eligible to vote as they spend at least 6 months in Abyei area (and up to 8 months) each migration season and therefore qualify for habitual residency. There is a view that it might help if the NCP and SPLM leadership take a decision on voter eligibility rather than leaving it to the Abyei Referendum Commission. The Misseriya will be in Abyei area during the 2011 referendum as part of their normal migration cycle. In addition, attempts to permanently settle some Misseriya in Northern Abyei are foreseen. For example, the building of permanent structures is being observed around Diffra area.
- As acknowledged earlier, in July there were two peaceful protests by Abyei residents pressing for (a) speeding up of formation of Abyei referendum commission and (b) Abyei border demarcation on basis of PCA award. An SPLM rally organized in the same month also focused primarily on the need for the Abyei referendum, which was defined as a right that no one could take away.
- There have been some reservations by the AAA to facilitate support targeting northern parts of Abyei area; for fear that this might encourage permanent settlements of Misseriya, particularly in time for the referendum. Ten boreholes were recently approved for the north and other support targeting the northern areas include mobile clinics by MSF-Swiss, food for education for the nomadic schools by WFP and training of Community Animal Health workers as well as provision of vaccines/drugs by FAO.

### **2.4 Migration (and related ethnic disputes)**

- Traditionally the chiefs were able to resolve local disputes with the Misseriya on an on-going basis. However, this has now become difficult because the problems have allegedly become politicized. The Dinka Ngok traditional leaders also argue that in the past there was also balance of power, but now it was a situation where negotiations were with armed Misseriya, which did not provide an enabling environment for proper conflict resolution.
- The 2009/10 migration (which was the first after the PCA award) did not have major security incidents in Abyei especially along the central and western migration corridors. However, the Misseriya were not allowed to cross river Kirr into South Sudan (Unity State) as the SPLA insisted that they leave their arms in line with the "no arms policy" in the State, which the former resisted. This polarized the Misseriya - Dinka Ngok relationships. Marial Achak in the eastern corridor was attacked by unidentified people in March and 1 civilian was killed and 2 injured. There is generally a problem of small arms among civilian populations particularly among the nomads who carry small arms to protect themselves

and their animals from raids. The Bentiu conference in March 2010 that brought together teams led by Governors from Southern Kordofan and Unity State and Abyei Chief Administrator produced a draft Framework agreement particularly focusing on among other issues the carrying of small arms by the Misseriya nomads. The Framework agreement was not finalized and hence, there was no agreed mechanism to facilitate for nomads to cross into Unity State. The Misseriya will naturally need credible security guarantees for them to consider disarming. Since mid June, many more civilians (both Misseriya and Dinka Ngok) have been seen with guns and this was after an attack on Maker Abior on 12<sup>th</sup> June and then in Tajalei on 5<sup>th</sup> July. Civilian disarmament will be the ideal solution, and it is hoped that a mechanism for disarmament will be found, given that the DDR programme is ordinarily not responsible for disarmament of civilians.

- Despite clarity of the CPA and PCA Award regarding guaranteed access to grazing rights, the Misseriya have fears that if Abyei were to vote to belong to the South, then this could compromise their access to pastures and water for their animals. The 2009/10 migration season was meant to be a litmus test on the PCA ruling that borders are not barriers. The Misseriya can cite the refusal this migration season for them to cross into Unity State as evidence that borders are barriers.
- On the first anniversary of the PCA award, the GoSS Vice President reportedly noted that the SPLM guaranteed to all Misseriya and other nomads that their traditional rights to movement through the Abyei Area post 2011 would continue regardless of the results of the Abyei Area and Southern Sudan Referenda. He highlighted that the border demarcation will never be a physical obstacle to any of the customary movements of people of the North and South who traditionally and seasonally migrate through the Abyei Area. However, the failure by Misseriya to access Unity State last migration season, prompts them to argue that the SPLA is the main cause of their problems regarding access to their rights to pastures.
- Following the positive impact of the 5 police posts that were established in 5 locations along migration routes, communities are requesting more police posts in the other locations. As highlighted earlier AAA is increasing the Police strength and this will help towards more security along the migration routes.

## **2.5 Returns and Reintegration**

- This is a key priority for the AAA who indicated at the beginning of the year that about 45 000 to 60 000 IDPs would return to Abyei. The current estimate being planned for by the authorities is 20 000. At the moment there is no confirmed information on the numbers and timing of returns and it is difficult for the international community to plan for support. In the month of May, a representative of the High Committee for returns advised that an estimated 30 000 IDPs would be returning to Abyei starting around end of June, but this never happened. There have been concerns by international community that returns during the rainy season would be inappropriate particularly many areas are difficult to access until after the rains. A workshop to discuss the government's preparedness for the returns was held on 22 June and the Chief Administrator officially opened the workshop. The AAA presented a draft returns framework and requested the support of the international community to assist the returns process.
- The 2009 return process (that followed the 2008 displacements) was less organized as only 1 739 out of a total of 2 355 returnees were verified and given reintegration packages which included food (3 months reintegration ration) and non food items. As a learning point and as part of preparedness, the international community and authorities collaborated and established Dokura reception centre, 10km north of Abyei. It is intended that returnees will arrive at the reception centre in batches of 80 to 100 families (maximum 600 individuals) and would spend 1 to 2 days at the centre before proceeding to their destinations.

- Whilst the return of IDPs is an imperative and a human right, the issue of returns has become politicized with attempts to directly link any returns to the referendum. For that reason, the basic approach by the international community has been not to actively encourage/promote returns, but to only support State organized returns, under government leadership. Despite efforts by the international community to assist, generally there are limited/poor basic services in the areas of return and more support would be required to facilitate for access to basic services in the return areas.
- Challenges will be encountered when Dinka Ngok returnees settle in the locations north of Abyei town in villages perceived as previously out of bounce and largely frequented by the Misseriya nomads. There is also potential for politically motivated settlements in the north by the Misseriya nomads. The Dinka Ngok have alleged that about 2000 PDF elements were being mobilized from outside Abyei to come and occupy/settle in areas within (north) Abyei ahead of the referendum. In this polarized context, where there are counter-accusations, engagement of both the Dinka Ngok and Misseriya leadership will be critical. Settling of the returnees in the contested areas north of Abyei should be discouraged until an acceptable policy is reached on accommodating returnees and current residents. The returnees should ideally settle in their areas of origin.

## **2.6 Implementation capacity**

- There is limited implementation capacity both in terms of the numbers of international and national NGOs as well as the quality and quantity of AAA staff. The Chief Administrator is giving high priority to the training as well as recruitment of qualified AAA staff.
- The limited number of NGOs is a challenge to the UN who rely on the former as implementing partners. For example no NGO is ready to be partner for NFIs distribution, because they are already overwhelmed. IOM who could potentially take up the role have financial constraints.
- The AAA continues to suffer severe budget constraints and this compromises its capacity to lead provision of basic services.
- Generally the AAA continues to face challenges in providing basic services to the population (as it has the primary responsibility) and continues to largely rely on the international community, which itself has limitations as well. Given the scale of the needs, there is always the danger that the international community whilst doing its best can find itself of being accused of not doing enough.
- UN agencies are constrained by the operational environment. UNMIS which also has space constraints has been doing its best to provide support within its means but the relatively high cost of accommodation for non UNMIS staff has been a major constraint for agencies, particularly in terms of mobilizing national staff to work in Abyei. The construction of the UN Common premises will alleviate many challenges. However, the Agencies have been struggling to raise adequate funding for the Common premises and to date only 50% of the required amount has been raised. The weather has also significantly contributed the slow process of construction.

## **2.7 Access challenges**

- The rainy season (June to October) affects the provision of basic services as it makes it very difficult to access areas that are not along major roads. Programming is compromised and Agencies such as WFP and FAO resort to prepositioning of items such as food and seeds respectively.
- The insecurity along the main road from Kadugili (particularly the Higlig-Nyama stretch) has negative impacts including restricted flow of goods to the main markets in Abyei town leading to increased prices of staple foods. The insecurity along this major road forces the international community to rely on UN flights and military escorts.

- As acknowledged earlier, the fact that the AAA has been reluctant to encourage provision of basic services by the international community to the north has led to the Misseriya viewing the international community as not impartial. Resultantly, access to the North has been difficult for the international community, as the Misseriya were accusing the international community of favouring the South of Abyei. For example, Domboloya was a “no go area” for about 2.5 months from 13<sup>th</sup> February to 2<sup>nd</sup> May following threats against the UN by the Misseriya. As acknowledged earlier, there was also an incident on 12<sup>th</sup> July in Umm Khaer where the JMT was confronted by about 100 militant Misseriya (some armed) and advised not to come back to the area unless and until their humanitarian demands had been met. However, the situation is now normal and the international community can largely access all areas in Abyei. Following the 12<sup>th</sup> July incident, the humanitarian community met and agreed that (i) the Misseriya people should be encouraged to approach the AAA as the ones who have the primary responsibility for service provision and that (ii) the AAA should also be encouraged to reach out to all areas in Abyei to engage with the people on the ground. There is on-going engagement with authorities regarding more engagement with communities in the northern, given that the international community has to be guided by authorities and operate within framework of their priorities.

## 2.8 Politicization of government structures

- The Abyei Area Administration (AAA) has 5 departments, with 3 being headed by SPLM Secretaries and 2 by NCP secretaries. (Please annex 1 for details). SPLM heads the following (a) Finance and Economic Planning, (b) Agriculture and Animal Resources and (c) Physical Infrastructure and Public Utilities. NCP heads (a) Local Government and Human Resources and (b) Social Services (including education, health and social welfare). The fact that AAA is shared between NCP and SPLM creates its own challenges as many non political issues are seen with a political lens. As a result there can be unfair accusations by government officials of the international community of siding with one side.
- Although there is supposed to be a joint SSRRC/HAC office, the two components largely continue to operate separately and there are efforts to resolve this challenge. The international community has to consciously engage both sides on an on-going basis.

## 3. Key Sector Highlights

- The food security situation in Abyei area requires the support of all partners involved in the sector. A food security assessment conducted by WFP in October 2009 points at 48% of the population being moderately food insecure and 30% severely food insecure. In addition to these needs, the food security and livelihoods of returnees needs to be supported. The principal livelihood activity for the Abyei area community should be agriculture in addition to livestock farming, particularly given that the area has fertile soils and good rainfall. Promotion of livelihoods through timely provision of tools, seeds and training to improve agriculture practices is indispensable. About 52 000 people in 34 villages in Abyei are receiving **food aid** and this could be about 70% of the entire Abyei area population. By the end of 2010, WFP will begin transitioning support to vulnerable populations from general food distribution to safety nets projects such as food for recovery, food for work and food for training. These seek to increase ability of food insecure people to meet their own needs over the long term.
- Timely distribution of **NFIs and Emergency shelter** will be critical in facilitating for reintegration as well as in response to emergencies. However a key challenge is that there are no implementing partners for this sector. A robust monitoring and verification system is critical to properly monitor population movements including the return process and IOM is playing a key role in initiating the support for the SSRRC/HAC tracking and monitoring mechanism which will hopefully take off soon.

- The **health and nutrition** sector in Abyei is composed of weak network of health services with 75% of the health facilities being provided with basic health kits by the health partners including WHO; MSF-Swiss and GOAL. The WB has mobilized funding for the rehabilitation of Abyei hospital. Modalities for the implementation, including possible relocation of the hospital during the rehabilitation are yet to be agreed with the authorities. There are inadequate drugs; inadequate qualified staff and there is need for training of existing staff. There is lack of financial support to the existing staff, where more than (70%) are working voluntarily, with no salary. There is need for continued use of mobile clinics to ensure outreach to outlying communities. Only 49 % of the children under one year that were targeted were covered during last National Immunization Days and the immunization coverage will need to be improved. There is also a high malnutrition rate in Abyei and according to GOAL, the severe malnutrition rate is 2.4% whilst the Global Acute Malnutrition rate is 19.1% (which is above the emergency thresh-hold of 15%).
- There is a need for AAA to provide continued access to clean drinking **water** for both the nomads and returnee communities. Water points need to be increased and maintained and Community based water management is also critical. The recent approval of 10 boreholes for the north was a welcome development as water provision in the South is relatively better than the north. According to the Sudan household survey, only 3% have access to **sanitation** facilities in Abyei and this is a key challenge particularly for Abyei town.
- There are inadequate schools, inadequate teachers and limited access to teaching/learning materials for the **education** sector. There is a need to train more and hire additional qualified teachers.
- Up to date, the Joint DDR Commission (JDDRC) has not been deployed to Abyei Area; and this has significantly delayed the implementation of **DD- R** operations. The Integrated UN DDR Unit (IUNDDRU) responded through various means: first through multiple- level pressures and dialogue to press for and facilitate the JDDRC deployment; secondly, by advocating among the parties to identify alternative solutions to allow operations to proceed; and thirdly, by a shift of focus to Community security and small arms (CSAC)/ Social Reintegration pilot projects – the idea being to reverse the process and first focus on the 'R' phase, to then pave the way for the 'DD'. The lack of permanent National interlocutors on the ground has affected long term reintegration strategies, together with the reduced number and capacity of Reintegration partners and a limited absorption capacity in terms of basic services, affecting long-term reintegration strategies. Alternative solutions identified until when the JDDRC is deployed include (a) coordination with a Joint Team of NSDDRC- Representatives, intermittently present on the ground and (b) the design and implementation of immediate reintegration/peace-building projects that have a positive impact on CSAC/ future DD- R processes.
- Threats from **landmines**, unexploded ordinances (**UXOs**) and explosive remnants of war (**ERW**) exist in Abyei, especially South of Abyei and this needs to be addressed. The current rainy season has exposed a number of UXOs within Abyei area and a team from Khartoum recently came down to remove these.
- In terms of **Rule of law**; Abyei does not yet have its own judiciary system and there is still uncertainty over the criminal system to be applied. There is need to clarify this issue and establish a judiciary system that will guarantee everyone's rights (including rights of nomads).
- The partners in **protection and human rights** sector address issues around the protection of rights and needs of civilians, particularly women, children and other vulnerable groups. A dropping centre which shall offer among other support vocational training opportunities for street children is under construction under the auspices of UNICEF/Department of Social Welfare. Human Rights and Child protection actors also work closely with Abyei Police and the Abyei/Agok traditional courts, on cases of children in contact/conflict with the law. The lack of a judicial system in Abyei has left justice in the hands of traditional courts, chaired by elders, who apply customary law/practice often in contradiction



of Sudanese laws which undermine the basic rights of women and children, but also of accused and victims. Capacity building activities, including trainings, are regularly conducted with members of the Department of Social Welfare, Abyei Police, traditional courts, JIU, civil society organizations on human rights, women's and children's rights, IHL and protection of civilians. UNMIS Protection of Civilians (PoC) has been active in the roll-out of the UNMIS Security Concept for PoC/other PoC guidelines to further enhance the protection of civilians in Abyei. The lack of a juvenile justice system is one of the main child protection challenges in Abyei. The administration needs to support alternatives to the ongoing arrest and detention of children. These include facilitating the speedy establishment of a functioning state court system, supporting the Police and Department of Social Welfare in using diversion systems, mediation and restorative and increase inter-state coordination to resolve unaccompanied child cases.

- Peacebuilding (CivilAffairs/UNDP) to help with a paragraph.

#### **4. Coordination mechanisms/fora in Abyei**

- The UN Resident Coordinator's Support Office (RCSO) is integrated with RRR in Abyei to support and facilitate coordination among the UN family, the AAA, NGOs, donors and other stakeholders. The coordination ensures that humanitarian, early recovery, recovery and development programmes/activities by all stakeholders are synergistic, complimentary and well integrated to enhance their impact on the ground. Recognizing that the Government has the primary responsibility over its people, the activities of the international community are consciously planned to be within the framework of AAA's priorities. On 10<sup>th</sup> June, the Chief Administrator delivered a Policy Statement to the Abyei legislative council and this framework will guide the international community.
- The UN agencies and UNMIS work as a family and as a team and always strive to build consensus on key issues and approaches. It is only when the UN family is coordinated that it can then also effectively coordinate with other stakeholders. The UN family in Abyei consists of the following: UNDP, WHO, WFP; UNICEF, FAO, "IOM"; RCSO/RRR and UNMIS (including PoC/Child Protection; Integrated DDR; Human Rights; UNPOL; UNMOS).
- There are conscious efforts to link UNMIS military and UNPOL with the work being done by other UN civilian components and the entire international community to converge especially around conflict sensitive areas.
- There are currently 7 international NGOs (Save/Sweden; Mercy Corps; GOAL; PACT; AECOM, MSF-Swiss; HEAR). Other NGOs such as SNV, NDI are planning to establish themselves in Abyei soon. WB is also based in Abyei. Some NGOs that used to be in Abyei such as Islamic Relief; Norwegian People's Aid and Pancare left Abyei after the May 2008 clashes. The main local NGOs in Abyei are WARDS, ACAD, NDO and SudanAid but they also face capacity challenges. Most of the INGOs are still based in Agok, although they have started preparations to move back to Abyei.
- Key challenges highlighted earlier, including border demarcation; the referenda (especially Abyei referendum); migration and related ethnic conflicts and (anticipated) returns can precipitate humanitarian consequences. In this regard the international community is updating its inter-agency contingency plan that will facilitate for effective, timely and well coordinated humanitarian response to any humanitarian crises. Abyei humanitarian community has agreed to review the population estimates for Abyei from a range of 60 000 – 80 000 (April Contingency Plan) to a new range of 80 000 – 100 000. The main hazard likely to affect Abyei is conflict related to the Abyei referendum and there is a high likelihood of the worst case scenario happening, which anticipates an eruption of wider conflict (between north and south). It will thus be critical for a wide range of mitigatory efforts to avoid the

worst case scenario, particularly at high political levels. The existing contingency plan was last updated in April 2010 and the revised Contingency plan will be based on the worst case scenario. The humanitarian community will help to prepare for the worst whilst hoping for the best. The main hubs for provision of humanitarian assistance, if required, would be Abyei town, Agok; Muglad and Turalei-Warrap. UNICEF will also provide support from Wau. The support from Abyei town would be for a relatively shorter time as it is anticipated that civilians would move out of Abyei town as soon as they can. It expected that a revised Contingency plan will be in place by the beginning of September. UNMIS PoC are leading a FRAGO contingency planning initiative that will ensure protection of up to 1000 unarmed civilians in Abyei town for a relatively short period. The PoC Refuge site is on the western side of the UNMIS compound.

- The UN and Partners consciously reinforce the principles of accountability and transparency in their operations and strive to build strong coordination channels with the government. The table below captures the main regular coordination mechanisms in the Abyei (excluding special meetings that are called as necessary e.g. for Contingency planning and response)


#### Key Coordination Mechanisms/Forums in Abyei

	Participants	Forum	Chair	Frequency
Coordination at Abyei area level	UN Family	Senior Management meeting	UNMIS HoO	Twice a week
		UN State Team (UNST)	RCSO/RRR	2 weeks
		Area Security Management Team (ASMT)	ASC-UNMIS HoO	weekly
	All (UN, NGOs and Government)	Inter-agency meetings	Chaired by Chief Administrator with RCSO/RRR support	monthly
		Sector meetings (Sectors are as defined in the UN and Partners Work Plans)	Co-chaired by relevant Government department and UN agency	monthly
		UN Agency and Cooperating Partners (CPs) meetings	Co-chaired by UN Agency and relevant Government counterpart	Ranges from 1 month to 3 months.
NOTES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The key sectors are (i) Water and sanitation; (ii) Health and nutrition, (iii) education; (iv) Returns and Reintegration, (v) Food security and livelihoods, (vi) Protection and Human Rights and (vii) peace building. <i>There are UNDP lead discussions to introduce Local Government Capacity Building sector.</i></li> <li>• There is a proposal to initiate a weekly SMM/Chief Administrator meeting.</li> <li>• There is on-going collaboration/coordination with neighbouring states particularly on issues relating to peace building, security and contingency planning.</li> </ul>			

*Compiled by RCSO/RRR with inputs from all partners*


Annex 1: AAA Organogram

## ORGANOGRAM -ABYEI AREA ADMINISTRATION



Prepared by RCSO-RRR,  
UN/UNMIS, Abyei

Organogram- Abyei Area Local Government



Prepared by RCSO-RRR,  
UN/UNMIS, Abyei

**Chief A**  
H.E De

**Secretary**  
Hon  
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**DG for**  
Mr N  
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Chief o  
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*Compiled by RCSO/RRR with inputs from all partners*